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THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING
ANDREW M. PARDIECK*
ABSTRACT
The cost-shifting analysis employed by the federal courts in ruling on discovery
disputes is flawed. There is tremendous variability in how courts interpret the factors
guiding the analysis. There is tremendous variability in the information courts rely on
in deciding whether to preclude the discovery or shift its costs. The result is waste for
the litigants, courts, and society as a whole. This Article argues that there is a better
way: mandate cooperation before cost shifting. The courts should condition
proportionality and cost-shifting rulings on cooperation. The cooperation should be
substantive: require disclosure of objective information about the disputed discovery
and, if costs are shared, share control over the process. Cooperation will not come
about by exhortation or proclamation; it will come if the cost of discovery, or the
discovery itself, hangs in the balance. With that comes the possibility of reducing
costs. Asking “is the discovery unduly burdensome” results in a different answer than
asking “can it be done more efficiently”? This Article argues that the courts should
ask the latter question first and require cooperation in answering it. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 1, with its mandate to construe the rules to seek the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action,” demands it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Equity is a Rogish thing.” Or at least legal historian John Selden thought so.1 He
went on to describe it, in now famous terms:
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is
larger or narrower soe is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the
Standard for the measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors foot; what an
uncertain measure would this be.”2
John Selden could be describing the pretrial cost-shifting analysis used by the
courts today. There is remarkable variability in how courts decide when to shift the
costs of discovery, particularly electronic discovery.3 Some courts consider cost
shifting only if the electronically stored information (“ESI”) is inaccessible;4 other
courts consider cost shifting if it is fair.5 Some courts find $35,000 too much to spend
on discovery of ESI in an employment discrimination case; other courts authorize
discovery costing ten times that in the same type of case.6 Some courts include the cost
of attorney review in their cost-shifting analysis; some courts do not.7 Some courts
include the resources available to the requesting party’s attorney in their analysis;
some do not. There is a need for clarity as to what the courts are doing, and there is a
need for increased uniformity and objectivity in the norms the courts apply.
There is also a need for renewed scholarship on this issue. Scholarly writing on the
subject reflects an outdated reality. Widely cited scholarship starts with the premise
that “the presumption in favor of imposing on the producing party the costs necessary
to respond to its opponent’s requests remains largely intact, if not virtually
sacrosanct.”8 Other work suggests cost shifting is decreasing.9 Articles after the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggest cost shifting remains
rare.10
1 H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and Constructive
Trusts, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1993) (citing Edward Fry, Life of John Selden, in TABLE
TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 177 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927)).
2 Id.
3 Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the
Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 4–5 (2007).
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part III.
6 See infra Part IV.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011).
9 Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing Cost
Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1529 (2010).
10 Charles S. Fax, Cost-Shifting in Discovery after the 2015 Amendments to Rule 26, AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Oct.
12,
2017),
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Research for this Article, however, suggests that the Supreme Court’s presumption
“that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests,”11 while often invoked is now routinely ignored. “Shifting the cost burdens
of discovery, both for ESI and paper discovery, is no longer rare.”12 Research for this
Article suggests that courts routinely order some form of cost shifting. In the 178
judicial decisions analyzed for this research, they do so thirty-nine percent of the time.
Influential scholarship argues that the current rules externalize the cost of
discovery. Cost shifting, according to some, is necessary because the disparity
between the cost of requesting discovery and the cost of responding to discovery
creates incentives to ask for too much.13 Others argue that cross-party agency in the
discovery process allows the responding party to create and externalize unnecessary
costs.14 This scholarship proposes use of predictive coding and allocating the task of
searching for responsive information to the requesting party.15
But not every case warrants the use of predictive coding, either because of its cost
or because the information cannot be found with a text-based search algorithm, and
few litigants are willing to provide the unfettered access necessary for the requesting
party to complete the search.16 The scholarship on cost shifting remains incomplete.
Understanding better how courts decide when to shift costs, what incentives those
legal norms create, and whether there is a better way is also important because new
cost-shifting proposals followed the landmark 2015 revisions to the federal rules. The

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/civilprocedure/costshifting-discovery-after-2015-amendments-rule-26/.
11 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
12 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
13 See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 773; Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin,
A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference
in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 521 (2013); John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better
Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547 (2010); Andrew Mast,
Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. S 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV.
1825, 1830 (2010); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L.J. 561, 603 (2001); Marnie H. Pulver, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of
Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1401–05 (2000); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 455–56 (1994);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989).
14 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive
Search as a Solution to the In Terrorem Effect of Externalized Discovery Costs, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1473, 1498 (2014).
15 Id. at 1516.
16 See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL
246439, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (reciting objections to producing backup tapes to
requesting party “it would be highly prejudicial for [the requesting party] to receive e-mail . . .
that is unrelated” and “which may contain privileged or confidential information.”); William C.
Dimm, Predictive Coding: Theory & Practice 5–6 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.predictivecodingbook.com/sample.php (noting that files containing few words, e.g.,
spreadsheets, images, audio, video, are difficult to analyze using predictive coding).
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Advisory Committee to the Rules of Civil Procedure has continued to receive requests
to examine “a more radical form of cost-sharing where people requesting discovery
would have to pay for some or all of the expenses.”17 While that inquiry was tabled,
the debate continues, with the labels evolving from “cost shifting” to “cost sharing.”18
This Article suggests that there is a need to look beyond labels and to ask different
questions. In 2010, the Advisory Committee sponsored “the Duke Conference” to look
at ways to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation.19 Those at the conference concluded
that “[w]hat is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and
proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active, hands-on judicial case
management.”20
Following the 2015 revisions to the federal rules, proportionality now defines the
scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1), and changes to Rule 16 make explicit the inherent
authority of the courts to guide conversations regarding preservation and privilege.21
But the rules still make no mention of cooperation.22
This Article argues that the courts should predicate both proportionality and costshifting analyses on cooperation, defined here to include: first, disclosure of
information necessary to narrowly tailor discovery and objectively evaluate its cost,
and, second, if the parties share the costs of discovery, share control over the process

17 Tera Brostoff, Cooperation, Case Management at Forefront of New Rules; Cost-Sharing
on Horizon?, Feb. 5, 2015, BLOOMBERG BNA EDISCOVERY RESOURCE CENTER (“Cost-Sharing
as The Committee's Next Hot Topic”).
18 DISCOVERY SUBCOMMITTEE: REQUESTER PAYS, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
327–29 (Nov. 5–6, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11-civilagenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2FV-YPPR].
19 JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT],
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf; Grimm & Yellin,
supra note 13, at 496–97; 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/specialprojects-rules-committees/2010-civil (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
20 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 19, at 4.
21 Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civ.
Proc., to Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., in SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at
rules app. B-7–B-8 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/537SB3LH].
22 The 2015 Advisory Committee Notes reference cooperation, and even state that it is
necessary, but a failure to cooperate will not lead to sanctions. Id. at rules app. B-13. Some
courts have interpreted the revised language of Rule 1, now referencing party responsibility, to
implicitly impose “a heightened duty of cooperation in procedural matters such as discovery.”
Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. 15–1426, 2017 WL 85832, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10,
2017).
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or limit the cost shared. Cooperation will not happen by proclamation or exhortation.23
Cooperation will happen if it is required as a condition for the requesting party to
obtain the disputed discovery or the responding party to shift its costs.24
While this Article argues for mandating cooperation in cost-shifting analyses, it
also references proportionality, for two reasons: First, the cost-shifting analysis is
based, in part, on the proportionality standard set out in the federal rules, so there is
significant overlap in the analysis.25 Second, cost-shifting motions go hand-in-hand
with motions to preclude the discovery outright based on proportionality principles.26
Shifting the cost of discovery is often a fallback to precluding it altogether.27
As a result, Part II of this Article starts with the rule-based framework employed
by the federal courts in their proportionality and cost-shifting analysis. Part III then
addresses the courts’ application of these standards, and its evolution from viewing
discovery costs as “the cost of doing business,” to the marginal-utility analysis in
McPeek, the multi-factor tests in Rowe and Zubulake, and the proportionality and more
generalized fairness inquiries found in more recent cases. The discussion here focuses
on cases involving discovery of ESI, because that is where the costs are.28
Readers familiar with the legal framework and principal cases addressing cost
shifting may choose to skip to Part IV, which discusses the problems with these
judicial standards. Even well-accepted tests like the Zubulake seven-factor test have
become a Rorschach test applied by the parties and courts in a way that demonstrates
advocacy rather than principles and objective standards. Finally, Part V asks whether
it is possible to do better and argues that it is. It offers a series of proposals, partial

23 Hundreds of judges have endorsed the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation. Yet,
courts continue to find litigants view discovery as a “legal variety of hand-to-hand combat.”
CONFERENCE,
Compare
Judicial
Endorsements,
SEDONA
https://thesedonaconference.org/cooperation_proclamation?destination=node/51 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2020), with UnitedHealthCare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs., No. 16-CV-81180,
2017 WL 4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017).
24 The UnitedHealthCare of Florida, Inc. court ordered the parties collaborate and threated
to, inter alia, “strictly utilize cost-shifting” against any party or attorney who “fails to cooperate
in good faith.” UnitedHealthCare of Fla., Inc., 2017 WL 4785457, at *3.
25 Some courts now directly apply Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality factors to the cost-shifting
analysis. See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
3288058, at *10 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“Courts evaluate the Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality
factors to determine whether discovery imposes undue burden or expense such that allocating
expenses under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) is warranted.”); Williams v. Angie’s List, Inc., No. 1:16-CV00878, 2017 WL 1318419, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2017) (explaining that courts in the Seventh
Circuit “have transmuted the rest for whether the discovery is proportional under Rule 26(b)(1)
to guide the courts discretion in whether to shift discovery costs”).
26 See, e.g., Martin v. Hapo Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005 WL 8158778, at *3
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005); Mazza et al., supra note 3, at 170–72.
27 Mazza et. al., supra note 3, at 170–72.
28 See, e.g., NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES:
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, at xiii–xv
(2012).
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solutions, tied to each factor in the cost-shifting analysis. While varied, they strike a
common theme: mandating cooperation before cost shifting will improve the process,
and predicating cost-shifting decisions on objective factors will improve the result.
In 1930, Justice Cardozo wrote “[i]n equity, as at law, there are signposts for the
traveler” and “discretion . . . must be regulated upon grounds that will make it
judicial.”29 The same holds true for proportionality and cost-shifting analyses today.
This Article is about improving the signposts courts use in determining when to shift
the costs of discovery.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In 1939, Professor Sunderland described the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as marking “the highest point so far reached” in eliminating secrecy in civil
litigation.30 “Each party may in effect be called upon by his adversary or by the judge
to lay all his cards upon the table, the important consideration being who has the
stronger hand, not who can play the cleverer game.”31
In 1947, the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor stated that the discovery rules
“are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry
of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts of his
opponent’s case.”32 The Court emphasized that “civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial.”33
Courts today continue to cite Hickman v. Taylor for the proposition that “[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts . . . is essential to proper litigation.”34 Even after
the 2015 amendments, courts state that “[t]he rules of discovery, including Rule 26,
are to be given broad and liberal construction.”35 They continue to define relevancy

29 Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension of Snyder v. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 457
(N.Y. 1930).
30 Edson Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L.
REV. 737, 739 (1939).
31 Id.
32 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 507; see also Begay v. United States, No. CV-04-5109-, 2018 WL 557853, at *4
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2018); SEC v. McCabe, No. 2:13–CV–00161, 2015 WL 2452937, at *2 (D.
Utah May 22, 2015); Hill v. Auto Owners Ins., Civ. No. 14–5037, 2015 WL 2092680, at *11
(D.S.D. May 5, 2015); United States v. 2121 Celeste Rd. SW, No. CIV 13–0708, 2015 WL
3540182, at *11 (D.N.M. May 13, 2015).
35 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D. 23, 28 (W.D.N.Y.
2019); Artis v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-237, 2018 WL 3352639, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
July 9, 2018); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fayda, No. 14 Civ. 9792, 2015 WL 7871037,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015).
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broadly “’to encompass any matter that bears on or that reasonably could lead to other
matter that could bear on’ any party’s claim or defense.”36
At the same time, both the courts and the federal rules have articulated limits. In
Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court recognized that discovery has “ultimate and
necessary boundaries,”37 and modern courts re-affirm the time-honored cry that
discovery “is not intended to be a fishing expedition.”38
They do so in their application of three federal rules, which provide separate bases
for limiting discovery of otherwise relevant, non-privileged information: First, there
is the proportionality standard, formerly in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) now in Rule 26(b)(1),
applicable to all discovery.39 Second, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) specifically limits discovery
of inaccessible ESI.40 Finally, Rule 26(c) codifies the limitations set out in Hickman
v. Taylor, providing the court with authority to enter protective orders limiting
discovery and shifting its costs. 41 This Part provides context for each of these rules.
A. Rule 26(b)(1) Discovery Scope in General
In 1983, the Advisory Committee sought to discourage “disproportionate”
discovery, by encouraging courts to consider discovery in light of the “nature and
complexity” of the case; the importance of the issues at stake; limitations on
financially weak litigants to withstand discovery, and the significance of the
substantive issues as measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms.”42
To do so, the committee added Rule 26(b)(2)(C) enabling the courts to limit
discovery when (i) it is cumulative or the information requested could be obtained
more readily from an alternative source; (ii) the requesting party had already had
“ample opportunity” to obtain the information; or (iii) the burden of the discovery
outweighed the benefit considering:
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues. 43

36 Navajo Nation Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty., No. 2:16-CV-00154, 2016 WL
3079740, at *3 (D. Utah May 31, 2016) (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 (1978)); see also Begay, 2018 WL 557853, at *9; United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v.
Consumer Class Plaintiffs (In re Epipen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices &
Antitrust Litig.), MDL No. 2785, 2018 WL 2445100, at *2 (D. Kan. May 31, 2018).
37 Hickman, supra note 32, at 507–08.
38 E.g., FTC v. Liberty Supply Co., No. 4:15-CV-829, 2016 WL 4272706, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 15, 2016); Tottenham v. Trans World Gaming Corp., No. 00 Civ. 7697, 2002 WL
1967023, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendments.
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).
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On December 1, 2015 the analysis changed. The word “proportional” was added
to the rule,44 and the concepts of relevancy and proportionality conjoined.45 The
drafters of the rules incorporated the proportionality factors into the definition of the
scope of discovery, rather than articulating them as a limit placed on otherwise
permissible discovery.46
Rule 26(b)(1) now provides that parties may obtain discovery relevant to claims
or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case:
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.47
The drafters removed the language permitting “the discovery of sources of
information” because it was “unnecessary.”48 They eliminated the distinction between
information relevant to “claims and defenses” and “subject matter,” as well as the
language allowing the discovery of information “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”49
Arguably the most significant, and controversial, change was the incorporation of
the proportionality analysis into Rule 26’s definition of the scope of discovery. At the
2010 Duke Conference, when there was “no demand . . . for a change to the rule
language,” the Advisory Committee’s report to Chief Justice Roberts stated:
[T]here is no clear case for present reform. . . . There is continuing concern
that the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2), added in 1983, have not
accomplished what was intended. Again, however, there was no suggestion
that this rule language should be changed.50
Nonetheless, concerns remained that attorneys were not fully cognizant of the
proportionality requirements found in the rules:
[I]f you talk to trial judges who are routinely called upon to resolve
acrimonious discovery disputes, they overwhelmingly will tell you that

44 Lee H. Rosenthal & Steven S. Gensler, From Rule Text to Reality: Achieving
Proportionality in Practice, 99 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (2015).
45 Jonathan M. Redgrave & Hon. Elizabeth D. LaPorte, A Practical Guide to Achieving
Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 20, 51, 53
(2015).
46 Rosenthal & Gensler, supra note 44, at 44.
47 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-30–B-31.
48 Id. at rules app. B-4.
49 Id.
50 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 19, at 8.
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lawyers seem to be comprehensively ignorant of the significant limitations
that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) imposes on the scope of discovery.51
The Advisory Committee sought to correct this. Those favoring the revision
asserted that discovery costs are often disproportionate to the issues at stake, and those
costs bar access to the courts.52
Opponents saw the proposal as uniformly favoring defendants in litigation and the
factors identified as so “subjective and so flexible as to defy uniform application.”53
They voiced concerns that “proportionality” will become a new blanket objection to
all discovery requests and impose a new burden on the requesting party to justify each
and every request.54
The Committee sought to address both concerns by modifying the order of the
proportionality factors to consider first “the importance of the issues at stake” and then
“the amount in controversy.”55 According to the Report of the Judicial Conference:
This rearrangement adds prominence to the importance of the issues and
avoids any implication that the amount in controversy is the most important
concern. The Committee Note was also expanded to emphasize that courts
should consider the private and public values at issue in the litigation – values
that cannot be addressed by a monetary award. 56
The Committee also added a factor, “the parties’ relative access to relevant
information,” in order to acknowledge “the reality that some cases involve an
asymmetric distribution of information” and “recognize that proportionality in
asymmetric cases will often mean that one party must bear greater burdens in
responding to discovery.”57 Chief Justice Roberts describes these changes as
“crystaliz[ing] the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through increased
reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality.”58
B. Rule 26(b)(2)(B)—Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored
Information
Since 2006, the Federal Rules have stated in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) that a party need not
produce ESI from sources that the responding party shows are not “reasonably

51 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 516.
52 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-5.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at rules app. B-8.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
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accessible because of undue burden or cost,” unless the requesting party shows “good
cause.”59
The 2006 Advisory Committee defined accessibility in terms of “sources” and
“electronic information systems,” not the cost of review.60 The focus in the notes is on
the burden of discovering ESI from machines and media: While ESI is often easier to
locate and retrieve than paper documents, some “sources” of ESI can only be
“accessed” with substantial burden and cost.61 “It is not possible to define in a rule the
different types of technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of
accessing [ESI].”62 The systems may be “designed to provide ready access to
information,” or a “system” may “retain information on sources that are accessible
only by incurring substantial burdens or costs.”63
According to the notes, the parties are expected to turn to technologically
accessible sources first.64 If discovery is then sought from inaccessible sources and
disputed, the responding party has the burden of proof. The responding party “must
show the identified sources of information are not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost,” and sampling, inspection, or depositions may be necessary to
test the assertion.65
The rules do not define “good cause” for the requesting party to obtain inaccessible
information, but the Advisory Committee Notes consider the following factors:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to
produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of
finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other,
more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and
usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources.66
This good cause inquiry is coupled with the court’s “authority to set conditions for
discovery,” including shifting the reasonable costs of obtaining information from
sources that are not reasonably accessible to the requesting party.67

59 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; see also ChenOster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 301–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
63 Id.
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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C. Rule 26(c)—Protective Orders
The above proportionality and good cause factors provide guidance for an inquiry
that has long been conducted under Rule 26(c), the oldest of the general limitations on
discovery.68 Rule 26(c) provides that a court may “for good cause” protect a party
from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by, inter
alia, forbidding the discovery; specifying its terms; prescribing another method; or
limiting its scope.69
Part-in-parcel of the court’s authority to protect a party from “undue burden or
expense” is its discretion to condition discovery on the requesting party’s payment of
the costs of that discovery.70 In determining whether to do so, the courts have long
considered the proportionality factors now set out in Rule 26(b)(2).71 After the 2015
amendments, Rule 26(c) now expressly provides that a court may also protect a party
from “undue burden or expense” by “specifying terms, including time and place or the
allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery.”72
Scholars suggest the initial drafters of the federal rules “widely—if only
implicitly—assumed that the discovery costs were to remain where they fell.”73 The
current federal rules retain that presumption: while there is no express statement in the
rules that the responding party pays, the rules describe exceptions when costs are
shifted to the requesting party.74
According to Judge David Campbell, former chair of the Advisory Committee, the
2015 revisions were not intended to “work . . . any sort of significant change” to this
presumption. 75 The Rule 26(c) amendment was not intended to signal a change to
requestor pays: “In virtually all cases, if discovery is relevant and proportional to the

68 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
2035 (3d ed. 2020).
69 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
70 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); Bills v. Kennecott Corp.,
108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985).
71 See, e.g., Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07–2388, 2008 WL
3822773, at *6–7 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633
(D. Kan. 2006).
72 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at rules app. B-33–B-34.
73 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 774. The drafters expressly rejected language
requiring the requesting party to pay for discovery at least once. Professor Sunderland’s first
draft of the rule permitting interrogatories required the requesting party tender to the witness “a
fee of two dollars plus one dollar for every question in excess of twenty.” That language was
deleted before adoption. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 723 (1998).
74 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 520 (“Implicitly . . . the rules establish a presumption
that this burden and expense falls upon the responding or producing party.”).
75 Judicial Roundtable, The Nuts and Bolts, 99 JUDICATURE 26, 30 (2015).
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needs of the case, the party producing the information will pay for the cost of
production . . . . Cost shifting is now and should be in the future a rare occurrence.”76
At the same time, the rules have evolved to provide the courts with clear authority
to limit discovery and guidelines for doing so. Regardless of the rule, the guidelines,
over thirty years of rule-making, have been remarkably consistent: examine the
importance of the issues at stake; the importance of the discovery in question, its
specificity and cost, and whether the information is readily available elsewhere; the
amount in controversy and the parties’ resources; and the parties’ relative access to
information and role in preserving it in accessible form.
In sum, litigants and the courts are instructed to examine whether the burden of
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. The problem is that, despite the consistency in
the rules, there is tremendous variability in how the courts have applied these factors.
III. COURT APPLICATION
A. The Basic Presumption
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders gave voice to
the implicit presumption that the responding party bears its own expenses: “The
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
discovery requests.”77 Courts have accepted this as the starting point since.78 But it is
just that, a starting point for an analysis determining if and when to shift costs.
The analytical framework used by the courts in determining whether to rebut the
presumption has evolved. Early on, courts adopted norms that rarely resulted in cost
shifting, apart from copying costs. More recently, courts have expanded the scope and
frequency of cost shifting.79 Courts asked to engage in a proportionality analysis to
preclude discovery or shift its costs now routinely shift a portion of the costs to the
requesting party.80 They do so regardless of the rule applied: Rule 26(b)(1), Rule
26(b)(2)(B), or Rule 26(c). They do so regardless of the factors considered. They do
so where the information is relevant but inaccessible, and, more recently, where the
information is relevant and accessible but costly to produce. The following Part
contains a discussion of the principal cases articulating these norms.

76 Id. at 31.
77 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
78 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
3288058, at *8 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc.,
305 F.R.D. 225, 236 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013
WL 5338427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Rundus v. City of Dallas, 634 F.3d 309, 315–16
(5th Cir. 2011); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md.
2003).
79 See infra Part IV.
80 See infra Part IV.
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B. Rebutting the Presumption – Early Standards
Early decisions from the 1970s and 1980s addressed copying ESI, i.e. copying
computer tapes or creating digital copies of previously produced computer printouts.81
With the exception of one court refusing to shift the cost of duplicating computer
tapes, finding it “a reasonable cost of doing business,”82 courts regularly compelled
production and assessed the costs of creating copies of computer tapes or digital copies
of earlier paper productions.83
The first decision to set out a legal framework for analyzing cost shifting for
electronic discovery beyond copying costs came in 1985, in Bills v. Kennecott Corp.84
In Bills, and the cases that followed, the courts routinely rejected cost shifting.
Plaintiffs in Bills alleged age discrimination and requested information regarding
defendant’s reduction in force.85 Pursuant to Rule 26(c), defendant sought an order
requiring plaintiffs to pay its costs to produce a “computer printout.”86 The court
denied the motion, holding it “axiomatic that electronically stored information is
discoverable” if relevant.87 And if relevant, “the expense and burden to the responding
party should not only be balanced against the relative expense and burden to the
requesting party, but also should be scrutinized for possible excessiveness.”88
The court rejected “ironclad formulas” for determining “undue burden,”89 and
analyzed factors including (1) the cost of the request; (2) the relative expense and
burden in obtaining the data; (3) the burden on the requesting party to obtain the
information otherwise; and (4) the benefit to the responding party from producing the
data in question.90 In Bills, the court put ESI on equal footing with paper, and
conducted a cost-benefit analysis, acknowledging that the responding party is

81 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 130 F.R.D.
634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1989) [hereinafter In re Detroit Air Crash Disaster].
82 United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir. 1976).
83 In re Detroit Air Crash Disaster, supra note 81, at 636; Williams v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 (W.D. Ky. 1987); Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
84 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 461.
88 Id. at 463.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 464.
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generally in the best position to evaluate how to produce their own ESI, but courts
must assess allegations of burden for excessiveness.91
Subsequent courts acknowledged both the “ordinary and foreseeable” burden
associated with producing ESI and the need to cooperate. In 1986, a court held in
Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States:
The normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable
by the discovering party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a
respondent . . . Similarly, a normal and reasonable degree of direct
communication and assistance to the discovering party is the unavoidable
burden of the respondent, in the absence of a showing of extraordinary
hardship.92
Even in this early decision, the court sought to require the producing party to
transmit the data “in a reasonably usable way with a modicum of cooperation.”93
In 1995, in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, a federal
court again rejected cost shifting, finding the expense inevitable; best controlled by
the producing party; and best mitigated through cooperation.94 Here, the court declined
to shift the costs of producing email from backup tapes, holding “the mere fact that
the production of computerized data will result in a substantial expense is not a
sufficient justification for imposing the costs of production on the requesting party.”95
As in Daewoo, the court held that “if a party chooses an electronic storage method,
the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”96
Equally important, the court found that the burden of searching the email system
resulted from the limitations of the software defendant chose to use—a burden that
other defendants in the litigation did not have or claim.97 Where “the costliness of the
discovery procedure involved is . . . a product of the defendant’s record-keeping
scheme over which the [plaintiffs have] no control,”98 it would be unreasonable to
91 See Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices,
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA
CONF. J. 1, 118 (2018).
92 Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986); see
also Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18894, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16,
2002); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. June
16, 1999); Hurt v. Dime Sav. Bank, 151 F.R.D. 30, 31–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
93 Daewoo Elecs. Co., 650 F. Supp. at 1006.
94 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995
WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. (citing Kozlowski v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976)); see also
Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at 75–76 (“[D]efendant may not excuse itself from compliance . . . by
utilizing a system of record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses relevant records, or
makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate them, thus rendering the production of documents
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shift costs of searching the records to plaintiff. The court, instead, required the parties
to cooperate, “to consult with each other and agree upon meaningful limitations on the
scope of any e-mail search.”99
These early cost-shifting cases involving ESI drew upon well-established law. The
“mere fact” that producing documents was “burdensome and expensive” and “would
interfere with a party’s normal operations was not inherently a reason to refuse an
otherwise legitimate discovery request.”100 Size did not matter; organization did: “The
fact that defendant’s size requires it to keep a great amount of records cannot give it
immunity . . . Nor can the lack of an adequate filing system insulate a party from
discovery.”101 What mattered were the choices that the responding party made prior to
the litigation regarding storing the information. Courts “will not shift the burden of
discovery onto the discovering party where the costliness of the discovery procedure
involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s record-keeping scheme.”102
Filing systems and the information filed, however, change. As the volume of
potential discovery “once thought of in terms of numbers of pages” grew to terabytes,
this “explosion of information has brought along with it an explosion of costs.”103 This
increase in costs brought cost-shifting motions, and with it a change in the legal norms.
C. Rebutting the Presumption – The Marginal Utility Test
Subsequent case law criticized In re Brandname Prescription Drugs, often
omitting discussion of its emphasis on cooperation and disclosure and focusing instead
on the language suggesting that the cost of producing ESI is a foreseeable cost of using
computers.104 Subsequent cases labeled the test applied in In re Brandname
Prescription Drugs the “cost of doing business” test, and they rejected it.105

an excessively burdensome and costly expedition.”); Kaufman v. Kinko’s Inc., No. Civ.A.
18894, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002); Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of
Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
99 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1995 WL 360526, at *3.
100 Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1991); see also Keco Indus.,
Inc. v. Stearns Elec. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 912, 914 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Speedrack, Inc. v. Baybarz,
45 F.R.D. 254, 257 (E.D. Cal. 1968); Technograph, Inc. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 43 F.R.D.
416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rockaway Pix Theatre, Inc. v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 36
F.R.D. 15, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
101 Baine, 141 F.R.D. at 331; see also Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); Baxter v. Travenol Lab’ys, Inc. v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
All. to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D.
at 76.
102 Delozier, 109 F.R.D. at 164.
103 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 511.
104 See, e.g., Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001); Kemper Mortg., Inc. v. Russell,
No. 3:06-CV-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2006).
105 See cases cited supra note 104.
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In 2001, Judge Facciola, in McPeek v. Ashcroft, proposed an alternative, now
applied expressly or impliedly in most cases.106 In McPeek, plaintiff alleged retaliation
following a sexual harassment claim and sought production of email from defendant’s
backup systems.107 Judge Facciola flatly rejected arguments that the producing party
pay the costs of restoration as a cost of its “choice” to use computers: “It is impossible
to walk ten feet into [an office] without seeing a network computer . . . What
alternative is there? Quill pens?”108
While Judge Facciola rejected “the cost of doing business argument,” he also
rejected the converse, simply making the requesting party pay.109 He articulated an
alternative, a marginal utility test, for determining whether to shift the costs of
restoring and searching inaccessible ESI.110
A fairer approach borrows, by analogy, from the economic principle of
“marginal utility.” The more likely it is that the backup tape contains
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the
government agency search at its own expense. The less likely it is, the more
unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense. The
difference is ”at the margin.”111
In other words, Judge Facciola focused on the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues. More importantly, he required objective proof to decide this, i.e.,
sampling and a sworn certification of the costs and results of the search.112
D. Rebutting the Presumption – The Rowe Eight-Factor Test
In the year following McPeek, Judge Francis sought to define marginal utility more
precisely.113 In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., plaintiffs
alleged racial discrimination and sought email from both active servers and backup

106 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 31–33; see also Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles,
Inc., No. 12CV2472, 2014 WL 12642170, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Hagemeyer N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Certain Network
Interface Cards & Access Points, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-455, 2001 WL 1217233, at *1–2
(U.S.I.T.C. Oct. 12, 2001) (admin. law judge order).
107 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 31–32.
108 Id. at 33; see also Certain Network Interface Cards & Access Points, 2001 WL 1217233.
109 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33–34.
110 Id. at 34.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 34–35.
113 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
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tapes.114 Defendants sought a protective order precluding discovery or shifting
costs.115
Judge Francis rejected plaintiff’s “cost of doing business” argument “because the
costs of storage are virtually nil.”116 He also rejected defendants’ “requestor-pays”
arguments, finding that “it flies in the face of well-established legal principle . . . [and]
it places a price on justice that will not always be acceptable: it would result in the
abandonment of meritorious claims by litigants too poor to pay for necessary
discovery.”117
In lieu of both, Rowe articulated a balancing approach considering eight factors:
(1) “the specificity of the discovery requests;” (2) “the likelihood of discovering
critical information” or “the likelihood of a successful search;” (3) “the availability of
such information from other sources;” (4) “the purposes for which the responding
party maintains the requested data;” (5) “the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining
the information;” (6) “the total cost associated with production;” (7) “the relative
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;” and (8) “the resources
available to each party.”118
Many courts adopted the Rowe standard,119 and, in contrast to early cost-shifting
decisions, almost always ordered cost shifting.120
E. Rebutting the Presumption – The Zubulake “Gold” Standard
Recognizing this bias towards cost shifting, Judge Scheindlin modified the Rowe
test in her seminal opinions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.121 In response to
defendant’s request to shift the cost of email discovery from backup tapes, Judge

114 Id. at 424–28.
115 Id. at 423.
116 Id. at 429.
117 Id.; see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 94 A.D.3d 58,
64–65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
118 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429–30.
119 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02 C 4721, 2003 WL 21277129,
at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 7161,
2003 WL 23254, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002
WL 1264004, at *10–12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 99–3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *3–8 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002).
120 See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216
F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2002 WL 246439, at *7–9; Byers v.
Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); In re BristolMyers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002).
121 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317–20; see Sedona Conference, Cooperation Proclamation:
Resources For The Judiciary, Third Edition 39 (2020) [hereinafter Sedona Conference,
Resources for the Judiciary] (“Cost-shifting came to eDiscovery with the iconic Zubulake
decision.”).
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Scheindlin articulated a three-step, seven-factor test that has become, according to
some, the “gold standard.”122
The first step examines whether cost shifting must be considered in every case
involving ESI.123 According to Zubulake, given that ESI is no less discoverable than
paper, the answer is “no.”124 Instead, “whether production of documents is unduly
burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or
inaccessible format.”125
ESI is inaccessible if the data “must be restored or otherwise manipulated to be
usable.”126 If the ESI is inaccessible, the second step examines whether cost shifting
is warranted.127 Just as in McPeek, reliable information based on sampling is
necessary: “When based on an actual sample, the marginal utility test will not be an
exercise in speculation—there will be tangible evidence of what the backup tapes may
have to offer.”128
Finally, based on this objective evidence, Zubulake suggests the following
analysis: First, in order to maintain the presumption that the responding party pays,
“the cost-shifting analysis must be neutral; close calls should be resolved in favor of
the presumption.”129 In order to ensure neutrality, Zubulake modified the Rowe
standard to address “the amount in controversy” and “the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation.”130 It then omitted, as irrelevant, an inquiry into the purpose for
which the data is maintained.131 The result is a seven-factor test examining:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;

122 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317–20, 323; see also Price v. Synapse Group, No. 16CV1524BAS(BLM), 2018 WL 9517276, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2019); Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp.,
No. C 05-02520 TEH, 2008 WL 3287035, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2008); Maria Perez Crist,
Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58
S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006); Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 781; Mast, supra note 13, at
1827; James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on the E-discovery Cost-Shifting
Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004).
123 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 318. Zubulake identifies five types of data: (1) active, online; (2) near-line; (3)
offline storage/archives; (4) backup tapes; and (5) erased, fragmented or damaged data, and
determines that the first three categories are typically accessible, while the latter two are not.”
Id. at 319–20.
126 Id. at 320.
127 Id. at 323.
128 Id. at 324.
129 Id. at 320.
130 Id. at 321.
131 Id.
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2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.132
According to Zubulake, these factors are not a checklist. The focus must be: “does
the request impose an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party” and “how
important is the sought-after evidence in comparison to the cost of production?”133 In
answering these questions, the first two factors—the marginal utility factors—are
most important and the last two factors least. 134 “[T]he importance of the litigation”
will “only rarely come into play” and “the relative benefits of the production” will
generally benefit the requesting party, but “in the unusual case” may also benefit the
responding party and that fact “may weigh against shifting costs.”135
The Zubulake decisions provided the basis for the 2006 revisions to the federal
rules.136 As discussed supra, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) now distinguishes between accessible
and inaccessible ESI, as defined by whether the ESI requires restoration. If
inaccessible information is sought and restoration required, the 2006 Advisory
Committee Notes consider the factors discussed in both Rowe and Zubulake.
In the years since, courts have tweaked the standard. The Seventh Circuit modified
the Zubulake factors to expressly include an eighth factor, one identified in Rule
26(b)(2)(C), “the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of the
litigation.”137 But, whether in whole or part, federal courts have adopted the Zubulake
standard widely, referring to Zubulake as the “leading opinion” on the subject.138
132 Id. at 322.
133 Id. at 322–23.
134 Id. at 323.
135 Id.
136 Jacob Smith, Electronic Discovery: The Challenges of Reaching into the Cloud, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1561, 1567 (2012).
137 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09-CV-3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572–73 (N.D.
Ill. 2004).
138 See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (describing
Zubulake as “undoubtably” the “leading opinion” on the subject). Courts adopting Zubulake
include Zeller v South Central Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:13–CV–2584, 2014 WL
2094340 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014); Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12–5109, 2014 WL
1608664 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); W Holding Co., Inc. v. Chartis Ins. Co. of P.R., 293 F.R.D.
68 (D.P.R. 2013); Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Juster Acq. Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12–3427, 2013
WL 541972 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012
WL 6732905 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09CV-3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621,
2011 WL 2971118 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2011); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL
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F. Rebutting the Presumption – Beyond Accessibility
Zubulake and its progeny make clear that “cost-shifting does not even become a
possibility unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility.”139 The “obvious negative
corollary” to this is that “accessible data must be produced at the cost of the producing
party.”140
But this limitation is ignored by a growing number of courts.141 In these decisions,
definitions of “undue burden or expense” based on the technical accessibility of the

2551546 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09-CV-00689, 2010 WL 4065368
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010); Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., No.
09CV00689, 2010 WL 4928866 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010); Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank
of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL
3446761 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009); Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07532, 2008 WL 1805727 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577 (W.D.
Wis. 2007); PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633 (D. Kan. 2006);
Hagemeyer N.A., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Wiginton
v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572–73 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Multitechnology Servs.,
L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02–CV–702, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); OpenTV
v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit
Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
139 Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Almont Ambulatory
Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc, No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *6–7
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Nehad v. Browder, No. 15-CV-1386, 2016 WL 3769807, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. July 15, 2016); United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 12–CV–00295, 2015
WL 5056726, at *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015); Hausman v. Holland Am. Line-USA, No.
13cv00937, 2015 WL 11234152, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2015); Cochran v. Caldera Med.,
Inc., No. 12–5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); Lindsay v. Clear
Wireless, LLC, No. 13–834, 2014 WL 813875, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2014); Laethem Equip.
Co. v. Deere & Co., 261 F.R.D. 127, 145 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Juster Acq. Co. v. N. Hudson
Sewerage Auth., No. 12–3427, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Novick v.
AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013);
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 301–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Nogle v.
Beech St. Corp., No. 10–CV–01092, 2012 WL 3687570, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2012); Adair
v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *3–5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2012);
Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08CV00342, 2010 WL 2179180, at *10 (E.D. Ark. May 27,
2010); Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. July 7, 2008); Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-532, 2008
WL 1805727, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008); Io Grp. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C0603926, 2007 WL 1113800, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239
F.R.D. 81, 91 n.23 (D.N.J. 2006); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
140 Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Hawa v. Coatesville, No. 154828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017); Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med.
Servs., Inc., No. 13–CV–2584, 2014 WL 2094340, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014).
141 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
3288058, at *9 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“Although the court in Zubulake stated that ‘[a] court
should consider cost-shifting only when electronic data is relatively inaccessible,’… that
approach is no longer accepted.”); N. Shore–Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. Multiplan,
Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 51–53 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (inviting briefing on shifting the costs of production
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storage media give way to general inquiries into burden, ESI volume and cost, and
whether it is fair to shift the costs.142 There are two types of these cases: in the first,
courts conduct a broad-based proportionality analysis applying either the Zubulake
factors or the proportionality standard now set out in Rule 26(b)(1).143 In the second,
courts more generally seek to do what is fair.144 In these latter cases, “[a]ccessibility
turns largely on the expense of production.”145
United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc. provides an often-cited
example of the first. 146 Plaintiffs, in a qui tam action, sought documents relating to
recruiter compensation found on defendant’s active servers and backup tapes.147 The
court ordered production, without cost shifting, from a tape providing access to email
between key players.148

for accessible database reports); United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305
F.R.D. 225, 240 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]ost-shifting has been extended beyond merely
inaccessible ESI.”); United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., 12-CV-881, 2014 WL
12787823, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014) (noting the split); FDIC v. Bowden, No. CV413–
245, 2014 WL 2548137, at *6 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2014) (“‘inaccessible’ . . . can mean
prohibitively expensive”).
142 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 239
(S.D. Cal. 2015); Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., 11–CV–00991, 2013 WL 1310216, at *5
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 11-0042, 2012 WL 899631 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 15, 2012); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012);
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 06CV524, 2007 WL 496716, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
13, 2007); Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Devs. Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 WL
333987, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007); Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109,
2005 WL 8158778, at *2–3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005).
143 See, e.g., Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020
WL 1689708, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020); Duhigg v. Indus., No. 15CV91, 2016 WL 4991480,
at *2–4 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 2016); Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 15-CV-05579,
2016 WL 4061575 at *2–4 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2016); Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr.,
LLC, No. 15cv570, 2016 WL 3893135, at *3–4 (W.D. Va. July 14, 2016); United States ex rel.
Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 240; Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005 WL
8158778, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005).
144 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL
485846, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546,
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies, 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
145 See, e.g., Couch, 2011 WL 2551546, at *3–4; E & J Gallo Winery v. Encana Energy Serv.
Inc., No. CV-F-03-5412, 2004 WL 7342781, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2004) (“Taking into
account defendant’s privilege claims, the requested material is not readily accessible.”).
146 United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 227; see also 3 ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION FEDERAL COURTS § 26:28 (4th ed. Supp. 2019); CAROLE BASRI
& MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 25:2 (2020); ADAM I. COHEN &
DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.05 (2020).
147 United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 232.
148 Id. at 242.
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In addressing the remaining requests, it noted that the proliferation of ESI has
prompted the courts to “reconsider their disinclination to authorize cost shifting.”149
The court analyzed the rules discussed above and concluded that a balancing test
weighing the benefits and burdens of the discovery applies “regardless of the
documents’ original medium, whether it be code or pulp.”150 It analyzed Rowe,
Zubulake, and their progeny and concluded that even as the distinction between
accessible and inaccessible ESI has gained prominence, “this preference for costshifting has been extended beyond merely inaccessible ESI.”151
Citing the remaining discovery’s marginal relevance, the court applied the
Zubulake factors to deny plaintiffs’ motion to compel restoration of additional backup
tapes unless they paid for it.152 In defining price, the court held: “As to all ESI, whether
accessible or inaccessible . . . Plaintiffs will bear the cost of searching and recovery.
Defendants, however, will bear the cost of production.”153 In shifting the costs of
restoration, as well as the costs to search for relevant information, it rejected earlier
norms and articulated a “preference for cost-shifting . . . beyond merely inaccessible
ESI.”154
Shortly before publication of this Article, in a decision that may become the new
“gold standard,” the court in Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. applied Rule
26(b)(1)’s proportionality standard to cost shifting.155 In contesting an alleged breach
of a non-compete, plaintiff sought discovery of accessible information relating to
business overlap between defendant and a non-party.156 Plaintiff engaged in a
“scattershot” approach, requesting defendant search over a hundred custodians’
ESI,157 using as many as 803 terms, including common terms like “paint”.158 When
sampling showed few responsive documents, most “technically responsive” but
“largely irrelevant,”159 plaintiffs demanded use of predictive coding.160 Defendant
explained the issue of “business overlap” was so broad that traditional eDiscovery
149 Id. at 237–38.
150 Id. at 237.
151 Id. at 240.
152 Id. at 242–44, 247.
153 Id. at 247.
154 Id. at 240.
155 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *1
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020), aff'd, No. 18-1100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2020).
156 Id.
157 Id. at *3 (plaintiff demanded defendant search 69 custodians, plus each custodians’
assistant’s ESI).
158 Id. at *3, *5, *17-18.
159 Id. at *5.
160 Id. at *6.
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processes were ineffective and began more targeted collections based on custodian
interviews. The court warned plaintiff, repeatedly, of the risk of cost shifting if they
pursued their original eDiscovery requests, but plaintiff persisted.161 After a search of
its original collection using predictive coding yielded few relevant documents,
defendant filed its motion to shift costs, pursuant to Rule 26(c).162
In ruling on the motion, the court applied Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality
factors.163 Each factor pointed to cost shifting, but the court, in two separate decisions,
emphasized the final two factors: When the court examined whether the discovery
sought information “at the very heart of the litigation,”164 the court found the
predictive coding that plaintiff demanded, as predicted by three earlier sampling
efforts, added nothing of value.165 At the same time, plaintiff exacerbated the problem
by demanding a “bloated ESI collection” from custodians unlikely to have relevant
information, resulting in large volumes and low responsiveness rates, which plaintiff
sought to remedy by demanding a high recall rate.166 The result is not surprising: After
warning plaintiff three times about shifting costs, the court shifted costs, $754,029.46
for the predictive coding review.167 The court’s analysis is, however, remarkable for
its careful application of the proportionality factors, and its adherence to the default

161 Id. at *22.
162 Id. at *8.
163 It found the parties’ breach of contract claim did not implicate any broad societal issues,
and the amount in controversy large but less relevant because the defendant had already borne
significant discovery expenses and produced significant discovery. In examining the parties’
relative access to information, the court noted defendant had produced relevant information
regarding contended areas of business overlap, while plaintiff had not pursued any necessary
third-party discovery. Regarding resources, it found defendant a Fortune 500 company enduring
massive layoffs, while an investment company, pursuant to an indemnification agreement, had
a subrogated interest in plaintiffs claim and funded plaintiff’s litigation costs. Id. at *3, *11-14.
164 Id. at *15 (citing Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.R.D. 1,
8 (D.D.C. 2017)).
165 Id. at * 7; Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
6343292, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2020), aff'd, No. 18-1100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan.
Nov. 24, 2020).
166 Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *20. Recall is defined as: “The fraction of Relevant
Documents that are identified as Relevant by a search or review effort.” Maura R. Grossman &
Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED.
CT. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013).
167 The court “mindful of the default rule that the producing party should ordinarily bear the
costs of production [found] good cause to require both parties to bear some portion of the
expenses for the overall ESI/TAR process.” It went on to find defendant had already borne
approximately $150,000 through the ESI sampling exercises and imposed the remainder,
approximately $750,000 in costs associated with plaintiff’s request defendant utilize predictive
coding on plaintiff. Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *1, *22; Lawson, 2020 WL 6343292, at *1;
Lawson, 2020 WL 6939752, at *1.
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rule for core discovery: the requesting party bore the costs of sampling and the more
targeted collections that produced relevant documents.168
The courts’ increased willingness to shift costs is also embodied in decisions that
spend little time applying proportionality factors and focus instead on fairness. In
Boeynaems v. L.A. Fitness, Int’l, LLC, putative class plaintiffs sought accessible ESI,
including email from seven custodians, and “member notes” from a customer
database, which the defendant estimated would cost almost $600,000 to produce.169
In ruling on the requests, the court focused on fairness: “Discovery need not be perfect,
but discovery must be fair.”170 The court noted discovery in this case was
asymmetrical, with the defendants producing many more documents than plaintiffs,
and allowing the requested discovery would “dramatically increase the economic
pressure on the defendant.”171
The court held that “where the cost of producing documents is very significant,
the Court has the power to allocate the cost of discovery, and doing so is fair.”172 The
court mandated “fair and appropriate” cost allocation concluding that “where (1) class
certification is pending, and (2) the plaintiffs have asked for very extensive discovery,
compliance with which will be very expensive, that absent compelling equitable
circumstances to the contrary, the plaintiffs should pay for the discovery they seek.”173
This general fairness inquiry extends beyond discovery related to class
certification. One sees the same analysis in breach of contract and breach of warranty
actions; gender discrimination and retaliation cases, whether brought by individuals
or commercial entities.174
Courts have split the costs of producing email from two hard drives because
“fairness and efficiency” require it.175 Without any legal analysis, courts will “share
equally” the cost of a forensic examination or the costs to obtain documents because

168 Lawson, 2020 WL 3288058, at *22.
169 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see also Craig
B. Shaffer, The “Burdens” of Applying Proportionality, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 90–91 n.97
(2015).
170 Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. at 333.
171 Id. at 334.
172 Id. at 335.
173 Id. at 341. Compare Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:05CV0024, 2008 WL
4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (“Because the sheer size of the discovery already
produced . . . and the immense size of the discovery now ordered to be produced . . . the Court
finds cost shifting is reasonable and fair.”), with Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ.
8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (“The presumption created by
Boeynaems has never been adopted in this circuit.”).
174 See, e.g., Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewage Auth., No. 12-3427, 2013 WL
541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546,
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011).
175 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
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“it seems fair to assume [they] will entail some cost.”176 Courts will split the costs of
producing ESI because the parties didn’t cooperate and the disputed discovery would
cost “at least $10,000 and produce gigabytes of ESI.”177 Courts will shift costs of
future discovery because previous discovery was unproductive.178 Courts will reject
cost shifting because of the “extravagance” of the litigation.179 Courts will reject cost
shifting after finding the discovery to date was “reasonable.”180 Courts will also deny
discovery outright because it is just too expensive: $35,000 is “too high of a cost for
the production of the requested ESI in this type of action,” i.e. a gender discrimination
claim.181 Accessibility is no longer the touchstone in many cases. “Fairness” is.
District courts confront cost-shifting issues in the context of either a motion for
protective order or a motion to compel discovery.182 In either context, the courts
exercise broad discretion, with appellate review limited to abuse of that discretion, or,
in some cases, a “gross abuse of discretion.”183 An analysis of the courts’ application
of that broad discretion shows an evolution. First, for decades, cost-shifting motions
came rarely and fell on deaf ears. The presumption that the responding party pay the
cost of the response, apart from copying charges, was enforced. Now, cost shifting is
“no longer rare.”184 Research for this Article suggests that it is routine. Second, the
standard applied by the courts to evaluate cost shifting has evolved. It has shifted from
consideration of the “cost of doing business”; to marginal utility; to multi-factor costshifting analyses; and now inquiries into proportionality and whether cost shifting just

176 URS Corp. v. Isham, No. 09–2955, 2010 WL 2428841, at *3 (D.S.C. June 11, 2010);
Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, No. C07-04330 RMW, 2008 WL 4786621, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
30, 2008).
177 Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 11–0042, 2012 WL 899631, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15,
2012); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2008) (splitting
costs of review “[s]ince both parties went through the same stop sign” in failing to collaborate
regarding ESI productions).
178 Self v. Equilon Enters. LLC, No. 00CV1903, 2007 WL 427964, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2,
2007).
179 E & J Gallo Winery v. Encana Energy Servs. Inc., No. CV-F-03-5412, 2004 WL 7342781,
at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
180 Robert v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., No. 08–2150, 2009 WL 1362530, at *1
(D. Kan. May 14, 2009).
181 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010) (rejecting
production of ESI in employment discrimination claim); accord Complaint at 19, RodriguezTorres, 265 F.R.D. 40 (No. 09–1151) (seeking reinstatement and damages in excess of $1
million).
182 See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 634 (D. Kan. 2006); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
183 Kilpatrick v. King, 499 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir.2007); see, e.g., Seattle Times, Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); Dove v. Atl. Cap. Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992);
FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 38 (7th Cir. 1980).
184 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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seems “fair.” The majority of decisions reviewed for this Article offer more than a
generalized fairness inquiry: they consider the factors identified in McPeek, Rowe, and
Zubulake, and the proportionality factors now found in Rule 26(b)(1). And those
factors form the basis of a reasoned inquiry, but they remain problematic.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION
This Part describes the remarkable variability in the courts’ application of the
factors outlined in Rowe, Zubulake, and the revised proportionality standard in Rule
26(b)(1). Scholars examining these factors in the context of Rule 26(b)(1) have
concluded that “implementing the proportionality standard will in many cases require
quantifying benefits implicated by intrinsically nonquantifiable factors.”185 The
factors provide judges with explicit “equitable discretion to consider normative
issues” subject to the same advantages and disadvantages of other balancing tests: it
allows judges to consider case-specific issues; it also involves “subjectivity and a
reduction of predictability.”186 As set out below, that puts it mildly. These factors have
come to serve as little more than a Rorschach test for litigants and the courts.187
A. The Importance of the Issues
Zubulake described the “importance of the issues at stake in the litigation” as a
“critical consideration” albeit “one that will rarely be invoked.”188 After widespread
debate, the 2015 revisions to the proportionality factors now suggest that the courts
should consider this factor first and foremost.189
Examining the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation makes sense. The
Sedona Conference Principles on Proportionality recognize that “nonmonetary factors
should be considered.”190 Common sense suggests that resolving a contract dispute
between two parties,191 while important to the parties, is less important to society than

185 Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in
Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1117 (2016).
186 Id. at 1118.
187 This Part follows the language and order of the factors set out in revised Rule 26(b)(1),
with the remaining Zubulake factors addressed as part of the cost-benefit analysis.
188 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
189 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
190 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 18 SEDONA
CONF. J. 141, 168 (2017) [hereinafter Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality].
191 See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bost. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d
459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This litigation involves a contract dispute between sophisticated
commercial entities, and therefore does not raise the kind of public policy issues that might
affect cost-shifting.”); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“This
is an infringement action. While parties certainly have an interest in protecting their intellectual
property rights, there is no indication that this case presents novel issues. As such, this factor is
neutral.”)
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litigation over civil rights, health care, the environment, and other instances where the
civil justice system immediately shapes the world in which we live.192
The problem is that there is no consensus on what should be considered public
interest litigation. Judge Scheindlin suggests that some cases have the potential for
broad public impact: “Cases of this ilk might include toxic tort class actions,
environmental actions, so-called ‘impact’ or social reform litigation, cases involving
criminal conduct, or cases implicating important legal or constitutional questions.”193
Judge Scheindlin does not include discrimination in the workplace: “Claims of
discrimination are common, and while discrimination is an important problem, this
litigation does not present a particularly novel issue. If I were to consider the issues in
this discrimination case sufficiently important to weigh in the cost-shifting analysis,
then this factor would be virtually meaningless.”194 Some courts agree with this.195
Some do not. In Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs & Co., a putative class action
alleging gender discrimination in the workplace, Judge Francis applied the
proportionality factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and concluded “the importance of this
litigation is not measured in dollars alone; the plaintiffs seek to vindicate the civil
rights of the class members, and thus further an important public interest.”196 Judge
Francis cited to the 1983 Advisory Committee Notes discussing adoption of the
proportionality standard: The rule “recognizes that many cases in public policy
spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.”197 As Judge Francis notes, the
very first example given by the Advisory Committee is employment litigation.198
So, is discrimination in the workplace an important issue for which broad
discovery should be permitted? Should it depend on whether the litigants appeared
before Judge Francis in the Southern District of New York or Judge Scheindlin in the
Southern District of New York? Should it depend on whether the responding party
invokes the proportionality standard under Rule 26(b)(1), the accessibility standard in
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), or undue burden under Rule 26(c)?

192 See Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058,
at *11 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Major Supreme Court Cases
in 2015, N.Y TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/us/majorsupreme-court-cases-in-2015.html?_r=0.
193 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
194 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
195 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Semsroth v. City of
Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638–41 (D. Kan. 2006); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474,
479 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
196 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also
Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *4, *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009),
aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010) (“This case involves allegations of racial
discrimination by public employees. In such an instance, it is not unreasonable to permit broad
discovery. . . . [P]laintiffs are pursuing issues of paramount public importance.”).
197 Chen-Oster, 285 F.R.D. at 306.
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 & 2015 amendments.
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Recent qui tam cases offer another example of disparate outcomes. In United
States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., discussed above, the court
summarily rejected plaintiff’s suggestion that a potential $2 billion recovery going to
the federal treasury warranted broad discovery.199 The court ordered plaintiff to forgo
discovery of disputed backup tapes or bear its costs, and it split the costs for all future
discovery whether accessible or not.200
In contrast, in United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, the court rejected
defendant’s cost-shifting request related to production of email from backup tapes.
“Because liability and corresponding recovery will recompense the public, this factor
weighs against cost shifting.”201 The court rejected notions “that this case is simply
about a transfer of wealth from one party to another. Instead, qui tam actions are an
important means of addressing fraud claims on behalf of taxpayers and the United
States. That fact imbues this case with heightened importance.”202
One finds the same variability elsewhere. In Hawa v. Coatesville Area School, a
federal judge sitting in Pennsylvania found a retaliation claim against a local
government involved important issues that weighed against cost shifting.203 In Haka
v. Lincoln Co., a federal judge sitting in Wisconsin attached no significance to
plaintiff’s retaliation claim against a local government, finding neither plaintiff nor
the local government had a lot of money so cost-sharing was warranted.204 In Couch
v. California, the court omitted all reference to the importance of the issues in a
retaliation claim involving allegations of prison management-condoned drug
trafficking and assault. 205
Are retaliation claims important in Pennsylvania but not Wisconsin or California?
Is qui tam litigation important in Nevada but not California? Do employment cases or
qui tam litigation or retaliation claims have greater “significance . . . as measured in
philosophic, social, or institutional terms”206 than anti-trust or environmental or
products liability litigation? Is there any way to determine the importance of the issues
at stake during the litigation? This factor, as currently stated, defies uniform

199 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 235 (S.D. Cal.
2015).
200 Id. at 242, 244, 247; see also United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 12-CV-881,
2014 WL 12787823, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014).
201 United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12–cv–00295, 2015 WL
5056726, at *11 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015).
202 Id. at *8.
203 Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 16, 2017).
204 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
205 Couch v Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2971118, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2011);
Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011); Second
Amended Complaint at 2, Couch v. California, No. CV08–1621, 2010 WL 3708821, at ¶ 1 (E.D.
Cal. July 8, 2010).
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
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application. Yet, with the 2015 revisions elevating the importance of this factor, its
importance has grown, and along with it the need to develop more objective measures.
B. The Amount in Controversy
What is the “amount in controversy”? This seemingly easy question begets more
difficult ones. How do you objectively measure the amount in controversy early in a
case? How do you meaningfully compare that amount to the total cost of production?
This factor has been characterized as the most objective of the factors in the costshifting analysis,207 but the courts’ discussion of this factor is dominated by conclusory
statements.
In some cases, there is a clear, objective measure of the amount in controversy, i.e.
a dispute over a $100 million insurance policy or a settlement agreement.208 In most
other cases, estimates have become tools of advocacy and a poor measure of
proportionality.
Courts routinely confront high-ball, low-ball estimates and paint broad-brush
strokes from them. In Zubulake, the court asked the parties to estimate damages
assuming a verdict for plaintiff: defendant estimated a high of $1.3 million; plaintiff
estimated $19.2 million.209 The court found it impossible to assess the accuracy of
either assessment, but concluded that the case had the potential for a multi-million
dollar recovery and “[w]hatever else might be said, this is not a nuisance value case,
a small case or a frivolous case.”210
Other courts end up in a similar place. In United States ex rel. Guardiola, plaintiffs
suggested a “multimillion dollar recovery;” defendants suggested it is “impossible to
analyze this factor because the amount in controversy is not certain.” 211 The court was
left to conclude: “this is not a nuisance value case, a small case, or a frivolous case,”
and “assuming this to be a multi-million-dollar case” the cost of the discovery is not
disproportionate.212
Many litigants simply ignore the issue, leaving the court to guess. In OpenTV v.
Liberate Technologies, the court concluded:
While the parties failed to provide the Court with any of the necessary figures
to analyze the total cost of production compared with the amount in
controversy . . . the Court has no doubt that this infringement action has the

207 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1096.
208 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *3–
6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401,
412 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
209 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
210 Id. at 288; see also United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12–cv–
00295, 2015 WL 5056726, at *10 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015).
211 United States ex rel. Guardiola, 2015 WL 5056726, at *10.
212 Id.; see also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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potential for recovery in the hundreds of thousands of dollars” and “the cost
of production is likely to pale in comparison.213
In Semsroth v. City of Wichita, neither party addressed plaintiffs’ possible
recovery, leaving the court to examine the record, and conclude “the costs of restoring
and searching the e-mail back-up tape does not seem excessive when compared to the
possible amount in controversy.”214
Some courts just ignore the issue, discuss the cost of production without reference
to the amount in controversy, and conclude that cost shifting is appropriate.215 Other
courts hold the parties’ inability to determine the amount in controversy weighs in
favor of cost shifting, “unknown damages cannot justify exorbitant discovery
requests.”216
In other cases, courts adopt without analysis one party’s estimate of compensatory
damages, without reference to other requested relief. In Haka, discussed supra, the
court cited only defendant’s briefs suggesting the potential recovery was less than six
figures and concluded “the potential damages are low, so that the cost of engaging in
the ESI search . . . is disproportionate.”217 The court omitted any reference to plaintiff’s
claim for injunctive relief, reinstatement to his former position, or his claim for
statutory damages and attorney’s fees.218 In Rodriquez-Torres v. Government
Development Bank of Puerto Rico, another retaliation claim, the court found $35,000
to produce ESI from active email accounts would create an undue burden.219 In doing
so, the court omitted reference to plaintiff’s complaint seeking $1.4 million in damages
and her request for injunctive relief, reinstatement to her former position, as well as

213 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
214 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638 (D. Kan. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 2012) (“[Defendant] has not discussed either the amount in controversy or its own
resources.”); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 16, 2017); Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel. Soto v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D.
23, 31 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 13–CV–2584,
2014 WL 2094340, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014).
215 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing
estimated total cost of production of $579,000 without discussion of the amount in controversy
other than “if, as Plaintiffs anticipate, their class action motion is granted, this case will suddenly
turn from a routine case to a major financial exposure for Defendant”); Rodriguez-Torres v.
Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing $35,000 estimated cost of
production without reference to $1.4 million demand set out in plaintiff’s complaint).
216 First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
217 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also Novick v. AXA
Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (simply
concluding that “the amount in controversy is small”).
218 Complaint at 12, Haka, 246 F.R.D. 577 (No. 06—594–c).
219 Rodriguez-Torres, 265 F.R.D. at 44.
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attorney’s fees.220 In Couch v. Wan, the court concluded that the estimated cost of
$54,000 to produce relevant ESI imposed a sufficient burden to warrant cost shifting,
again without reference to plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief.221
Courts will determine the value of a request for injunctive relief to decide if there is
subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity, but they will ignore it when deciding
cost shifting.222
The question remains: are these broad-brush conclusions sufficient? Should the
proportionality and cost-shifting analysis depend on whether Zubulake was a $1.3
million case or ten times that much? Is it sufficient for the courts to find the cost of
production likely to “pale in comparison?“223 Can a court, in the midst of discovery,
reasonably adopt one party’s estimate or consider only one of the remedies sought?
In analyzing this factor, courts end up offering cursory assessments based on litigants’
highball-lowball estimates and incomplete information.
C. The Parties’ Relative Access to Information
In response to public comments, the Advisory Committee added a new factor to
the proportionality standard in the 2015 revisions: the analysis now considers “the
parties’ relative access to relevant information.”224 The Advisory Committee Notes
suggest the factor is intended to address the “asymmetric distribution of information”
found in some cases, which “often mean[s] that the burden of responding to discovery
lies heavier on the party who has more information, and properly so.”225
There is little case law specifically analyzing this factor, and the courts that do
analyze it, do not struggle with it. In Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., the court that found neither party disputed that plaintiff’s CEO
possessed “relevant, unique information, and there appears to be no other way for
Defendants to obtain this information.”226 The factor favored granting defendant’s
motion to compel and denying plaintiffs attempts to shift costs.227 The court in First
Niagara Risk Management, Inc. v. Folino adopted similar reasoning: Defendant “has

220 Civil Cover Sheet, Rodriguez-Torres, 265 F.R.D. 40 (No. 09–1151). Cf. Disability Rts.
Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 148 (D.D.C. 2007)
(ordering production of ESI based on importance of the issues and requested injunctive relief.).
221 Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011);
Second Amended Complaint at 1, Couch v. California, No. CV08–1621, 2010 WL 3708821, at
¶ 8 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2010).
222 Compare McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 3890–95 (7th Cir. 1979);
Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010).
223 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Fleisher v.
Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012).
224 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at Rules App. B-8.
225 Id. at B-40–B-41. This means recognizing that in such cases “one party must bear greater
burdens in responding to discovery than the other party bears.” Id. at B-8.
226 Oxbow Carbon & Mins. LLC v. Union P.R.R., 322 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017).
227 Id.
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access to the information on his emails and text messages while First Niagara does
not, so the third factor weights in favor of First Niagara.” 228
At the same time, this factor raises more difficult issues. Courts regularly consider
the availability of the information from other sources.229 In Wiginton v. CB Richard
Ellis, Inc., for example, the court held “there is reason to believe that the requested
discovery would assist in resolving the issues . . . but because there is also other
evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claims, we find that this factor weighs slightly in favor
of cost-shifting.”230
In many respects this is a commonsense inquiry into whether the disputed cost is
necessary in the first place and whether the information can be obtained more
efficiently from other sources. The Sedona Conference Proportionality Principles
suggest that discovery should be “obtained from the most convenient, least
burdensome, and least expensive source.”231 The 2006 Advisory Committee Notes
addressing inaccessible sources suggest examining “the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources.”232
This commonsense approach falters because courts interpret “availability from
other resources” in very different ways. Rowe and Zubulake state the question
narrowly: they ask about “availability of such information from other sources.”233 The
discussion makes clear that they are looking for the same document from a more
accessible source.
According to Rowe, courts have shifted costs “because equivalent information
either has already been made available or is accessible in a different format.”234 Rowe
cites to cases where the information was originally produced in hard copy and the
requesting party sought the same information again in electronic form. Courts
following Rowe and Zubulake do the same.235
Other courts ask a different question. Is the same type of information available
from a less expensive source? In Byers v. Illinois State Police, the court agreed with
defendants that “depositions would be a more practical method” for obtaining the

228 First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
229 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–75 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
230 Id. at 577.
231 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 154.
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note to the 2006 amendment.
233 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(emphasis added); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (emphasis added); Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added).
234 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430 (emphasis added).
235 Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The documents sought are unavailable from any other source. Although hard
copies may exist of some requested information . . . the critical pricing, valuation, and customer
correspondence that Xpedior has requested . . . is only available from the DLJ servers. This
factor does not favor cost-shifting.”).
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information.236 In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., the
court found the costs of email discovery disproportionate, because plaintiff would
receive “a significant amount of relevant financial data” from other sources and have
“the opportunity to depose Defendant’s employees.”237 In patent litigation, courts
direct the parties elsewhere by restricting email discovery in order “to address the
imbalance of benefit and burden resulting from email production.”238
Other courts reject the idea that the requesting party should look to other
documents or take depositions because they are cheaper. They find that “efficiency”
comes at too high a price:
Defendant argues that plaintiffs can more efficiently secure pertinent
information concerning defendant's “practices” or “policies” through
interrogatories and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. However, defendant fails to
explain how it can prepare complete interrogatory answers or Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition answers without reviewing defendant's email correspondence.
Moreover, documents and correspondence are powerful evidence and a party
is generally entitled to review relevant documents rather than “take an
opposing party's word.”239
In rejecting claims that the same information can be obtained from cheaper
sources, some courts acknowledge that “email has become the principal form of
workplace communication”240 and because it “contains the precise words used by the
author” it is “a particularly powerful form of proof at trial when offered as an
admission of a party opponent.”241 Litigants suggest the same for social media—

236 Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 3,
2002).
237 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); see also Martin v. HAPO Cmty. Credit Union, No. CV-04-5109, 2005
WL 8158778, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2005); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091,
2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010);
Navajo Nation Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty., No. 16-cv-00154, 2016 WL 3079740, at
*2, *4 (D. Utah May 31, 2016); Wood v. Cap. One Servs., LLC, No. 09–CV–1445, 2011 WL
2154279, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011).
238 See, e.g., Hoist Fitness Sys. Inc. v. TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL
121195, at *3, *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (requiring defendant to pay for the cost of
production of the first 5,000 emails and shifting the remainder to plaintiff).
239 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07–1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *4 (D. Kan. July
21, 2009); see also Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 691 (N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009)
(“The court believes that some of the most interesting evidence in this matter has come from email production.”); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017 WL 1021026, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017) (rejecting responding party’s argument that an investigative grand
jury report provided an adequate substitute for plaintiff’s conducting their own investigation).
240 United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 12–cv–00295, 2015 WL 5056726,
at *7 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015).
241 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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deposition testimony does not replace social media discovery.242 And courts have
reached the same conclusion with regard to tangible evidence, finding that
photographs don’t replace inspections, even if they cost more.243
In cases involving information asymmetry, litigants routinely argue about a related
point—the responding party has already produced a lot of information; it shouldn’t
have to produce more. 244 Some courts accept that argument: “In the Court’s view the
most important considerations are the fact that defendants have already produced tens
of thousands of relevant documents”245 or defendant “has already produced many
documents in response to plaintiffs’ request” and further production would be “unduly
burdensome.”246 Some courts reject that logic.247 In Juster Acquisition Co., LLC v.
North Hudson Sewerage Auth., for example, the court held that if the information is
relevant and the request proportional, it is “irrelevant” that the responding party has
already turned over 8,000 pages.248
This again raises the question: have they produced the “equivalent information”?
Is this a question of seeking the same document from a more accessible location or the
same type of information? Does production of some relevant information, excuse
production of other relevant information?
D. The Parties’ Resources
Analysis of the parties’ resources compared to the cost of production presents
similar challenges. Rowe notes that “the ability of each party to bear the costs of
discovery may be an appropriate consideration.”249 Zubulake examines “the total cost

242 See, e.g., Charles W. Cohen & Ignatius A. Grande, The New Constant–Death, Taxes, and
… Social Media?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 3, 2013), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-andtelecom-law/the-new-constantsdeath-taxes-andsocial-media.
243 Guadet v. GE Indus. Servs., No. 15-795, 2016 WL 2594812, at *4 (E.D. La. May 5,
2016).
244 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97–2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. June 16,
1999); Juster Acquisition Co., LLC v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., LLC, No. 12–3427, 2013
WL 541972, at *2, *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D.
331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL
6732905, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); In re XPRT Ventures, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 10–
cv–00595, 2011 WL 13142141, at *14 (D. Del. June 15, 2011).
245 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,
2009), aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010).
246 Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *6; see also Fleisher, 2012 WL 6732905, at *1; Juster
Acquisition Co., LLC, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6; Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. at 334; Cognex Corp.
v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 01CV10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July
2, 2002).
247 See, e.g., Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *6.
248 Juster Acquisition Co., 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6.
249 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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of production, compared to the resources available to each party.”250 The accessibility
factors discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and the
proportionality factors now in Rule 26(b)(1) each examine “the parties’ resources.”251
There is uniform agreement that the relative resources of the parties is a relevant
consideration. There is no uniformity in how the courts apply this factor.
How do you define the scope of the parties’ resources? The 1983 Advisory
Committee Notes make clear that examination of “the parties’ resources” was intended
to protect the “financially weak litigant” from excessive discovery.252 Some courts
have expressly cited this factor to do so: courts have declined to shift the costs of
depositions where “the financial burden on the individual plaintiff . . . were he to be
required to pay defendants’ expenses, could seriously thwart his ability to pursue his
case.”253 Similarly, courts have shifted copying costs to the requesting party where the
respondent was indigent.254
Rowe incorporates this focus examining “the ability of each party to bear the costs
of discovery” noting that in some cases, the cost even if modest in absolute terms
might outstrip the resources of one of the parties, justifying an allocation of those
expenses to the other.255 Rowe went on to examine the parties’ individual resources,
without reference to those of counsel, insurance companies, or other interested
parties.256
The language in Zubulake is more expansive. In contrast to Rowe’s inquiry into
the parties’ ability to bear the costs, Zubulake examines the resources “available to
each party.”257 Doing so allows consideration of the resources of the parties’ law firms,
insurance companies, and third-party financing:
While Zubulake is an accomplished equities trader, she has now been
unemployed for close to two years. . . . On the other hand, she asserts . . . a
$19 million claim against UBS. So while UBS’s resources clearly dwarf
Zubulake’s, she may have the financial wherewithal to cover at least some of
the cost of restoration. In addition, it is not unheard of for plaintiff’s firms to
front huge expenses when multi-million dollar recoveries are in sight.258

250 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
251 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee note to 2006
amendment.
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee note to 1983 amendment.
253 Stillman v. Nickel Odeon, S.A., 102 F.R.D. 286, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
254 Simms v. Ctr. for Corr. Health & Pol’y Stud., 272 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2011).
255 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(emphasis added).
256 Id.
257 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
258 Id. at 287–89.
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Judge Scheindlin speculates as to plaintiff’s ability to finance the litigation, as well
as the resources of plaintiff’s counsel, but gives this information limited weight
finding “this factor weighs against cost shifting, it does not rule it out.”259
Some courts follow this example by considering the resources of the requesting
party’s counsel but assigning it limited weight.260 Some have considered the resources
of the requesting party’s counsel and declined to shift costs.261 Others, however, assign
this factor great weight. In Boeynaems, the court found:
Plaintiffs are represented by [a] very successful and well regarded
Philadelphia firm . . . which has had outstanding successes for many years in
prosecuting class actions, winning hundreds of millions of dollars for their
clients, and undoubtedly and deservedly, substantial fees for themselves. If
the . . . firm believes that this case is meritorious, it has the financial ability
to make the investment in discovery, to the extent the Court finds that cost
sharing is otherwise appropriate.262
Others refuse to consider the resources of counsel altogether. In Fleisher v.
Phoenix Life Insurance Co., the court noted:
[The defendant] alluded in general terms to the resources of the plaintiffs or,
more precisely, the resources of their counsel. However, it is far from clear
why the resources of counsel should be taken into consideration. Certainly,
Phoenix has not suggested that the wherewithal of the law firms that it has
engaged should be weighed in the balance. More importantly, if the assets of
counsel were to be taken into consideration, the ability of clients to engage
an attorney of their choice would likely be hampered. 263
On the whole, there is asymmetrical application of this factor. Courts either
consider the resources of the plaintiff’s law firm or those of the parties alone. None
have considered the resources of the responding parties’ counsel or an interested third
party.
Regardless of whose resources the courts consider, valuation remains a problem.
Conclusory statements are again common, and courts vary in deciding how much
further to go. What sort of objective financial data should the courts require? Should
the analysis require more than generalities?

259 Id.
260 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill. 2004);
Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
261 Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 11-CV-842, 2016 WL 1128494, at *15–18
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016).
262 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l , LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
263 Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
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Litigants commonly argue about resources in generalities, and some courts reject
them.264 Many do not: In Open TV v. Liberate Technologies, plaintiffs made
“conclusory statements” that the cost of production is small compared to the resources
of the parties, and the court simply found “no reason . . . to believe that either party
has a lack of resources in the case.”265 In Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,
the defendant simply argued plaintiff was “a large profitable company,” without
providing any comparison of his own worth or income. The court was left to surmise
“[b]ased on the voluminous pleadings in the court” that both parties have spent a lot
on legal services and must be able to bear the cost.266 In Semsroth v. City of Wichita,
the court observed:
The parties . . . failed to present any evidence as to the relative financial
position of the parties, but the court can properly assume that the four
Plaintiffs have significantly less financial capability to pay these costs than
does the City. However . . . the City’s ability to shoulder significant discovery
costs is not comparable to the investment banking organizations in both
Zubulake and Quinby[.]267
Other courts go into greater detail. In cases involving individual litigants and small
businesses, courts have considered affidavits describing the litigants’ living
circumstances and expenses and the businesses’ profits, losses, and debt loads.268
With publicly traded companies, they examine annual reports, financial statements,
and SEC filings to determine assets and net revenue.269 In Hagemeyer North America,
Inc. v. Gateway Data Sciences Corp., the court reviewed the requesting party’s annual
reports, annual sales, loss, and equity information and compared that with evidence
suggesting the responding party had “few, if any, liquid assets,” with “this factor
favoring cost-shifting.”270 In Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, the
court examined SEC filings to review defendant’s net revenues with those of plaintiffs,

264 See, e.g., Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. LLC., v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 1403053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp.,
No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011).
265 OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
266 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
267 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 639 (D. Kan. 2006).
268 See, e.g., Bailey v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. CV 16-2195, 2017 WL
2616957, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017); Symons Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 01cv00799, 2015 WL 4392933, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2015).
269 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575–76 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Decision and Order at 7, Hagemeyer N.
Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (No. 97-C-635);
Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
270 Decision and Order at 7, Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc., 222 F.R.D. 594 (No. 97-C-635).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7

38

2021]

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING

387

to find defendant’s assets “clearly dwarf” plaintiff’s, which weighed against cost
shifting.271
In each of these cases, the question remains: what do you do with the numbers?
Courts look for a large disparity in resources, and, absent that, decline to utilize this
factor to shift the presumption that the responding party pays. In cases where business
entities’ resources are more evenly matched, there is little discussion of those
resources and the courts hold this factor neutral.272
The more difficult question arises where both parties have limited resources. Is
that neutral or does that favor cost shifting? In Haka, discussed above, plaintiff was
unemployed after the defendant county government terminated him and argued that
he did not have the resources to search the defendant’s ESI. The court found that the
local county government had limited resources as well and split the costs 50/50.273
Examining the parties’ resources, like other factors, presents judgment calls.
Whose resources do you consider, how do you value them, and what do you do with
that information? This factor, like others, raises more questions than it answers.
E. The Importance of the Discovery
The next factor, the importance of the discovery, raises additional questions. As
discussed above, courts inquire whether the information sought is available from other
sources. They reasonably ask, will the discovery uncover relevant information? Does
it go to the heart of the matter? Courts, however, answer these questions applying very
different standards.
In evaluating the importance of the discovery in dispute, litigants and the courts
usually don’t know if the information contained in the disputed source is important.
In Kipperman v. Onex Corporation, the responding party sought to preclude discovery
of backup tapes or shift its costs because “we don’t know whether there is . . . a single
e-mail in any way related to this case . . . what we have is a pig in a poke.”274
Some courts take this uncertainty as a reason to shift costs—there is no proof the
discovery will produce important information; some courts take this as a reason not to
shift costs—there is no proof it will not. In Johnson v. Neiman, the court found “it
most significant that the plaintiff has no idea what, if any, discoverable information
may be obtained by cataloging, restoring, and searching the . . . e-mails that are stored
on the backup tapes.”275 In Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, the court found: “Plaintiffs
271 Xpedior Creditor Tr., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 466; see also Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 576.
272 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
273 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
274 Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (requiring the
responding party search a sample of two tapes, resulting in production of thousands of relevant
documents); see also Cargill Meat Sols. Corp. v. Premium Beef Feeders, LLC, No. 13-CV1168, 2015 WL 3937410, at *4 (D. Kan. June 26, 2015) (asserting, without offering proof, that
the importance of the discovery was minimal and would “add nothing”).
275 Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09CV00689, 2010 WL 4065368, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010);
see also Elkharwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 15-cv-05579, 2016 WL 4061575, at *3
(W.D. Wash. July 29, 2016); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

39

388

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:349

have not produced evidence that the backup or archived e-mails contain relevant
information that is not otherwise available or cumulative of other evidence. There is,
of course, a possibility that some of the requested e-mails contain ‘smoking gun’
information. However, this is pure conjecture.”276 This supported cost shifting.
Compare these findings with the decision in Juster Acquisition Co. v. North
Hudson Sewerage Authority:
[U]ntil NHSA actually runs the requested searches, neither NHSA nor
anybody else can know whether the ESI word searches will turn up
information that would have been available from any other source. . . . NHSA
fails to show how it would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative to
perform the requested ESI discovery. As such, the Court is not compelled to
impose such a limitation on plaintiff’s requested ESI discovery.277
The court in Semsroth similarly noted that Defendant had not attempted to view
any the email on the back-up tapes, despite having restored them, such that
“Defendants, like Plaintiffs, are merely speculating about the results of any e-mail
search.”278 Courts deal with uncertainty about unsearched sources very differently.
In analyzing the importance of the discovery, courts are consistent in asking, do
the requests go to the heart of the matter? The standard for determining the substantive
relevancy of the requests, however, varies. Should it matter if the discovery relates to
class certification as opposed to merits discovery? In Boeynaems it did: the court held
that “[w]here the burden of discovery expense is almost entirely on the defendant,
principally because the plaintiffs seek class certification, then the plaintiffs should
share the costs.”279 Other courts handling putative class actions have made no
distinction between cost shifting for discovery relating to certification as opposed to
merits discovery.280
Some courts addressing individual claims have rejected Boeynaems because it
addressed discovery related to class certification.281 In these cases, a more general

*6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578–79; Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No.
08CV00342, 2010 WL 2179180, at *9 (E.D. Ark. May 27, 2010).
276 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,
2009), aff’d, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010).
277 Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth, No. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at
*5 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013).
278 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638–41 (D. Kan. 2006).
279 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see also Wood
v. Cap. One Servs., LLC, No. 09-CV-1445, 2011 WL 2154279 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011);
Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., No. 05CV0024, 2008 WL 4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30,
2008).
280 See, e.g., Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-cv-01359, 2020 WL
1689708 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020); Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
281 Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
22, 2014).
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question remains: do the requests seek core or marginally relevant information? It is
not uncommon for parties to seek cost shifting right out of the starting gate. Litigants
routinely seek to shift the cost of responding to first requests for production of
information directly relevant to the action. Rowe dealt with a first request for
production of documents seeking, e.g., internal communications relating to selection
of concert promoters where plaintiffs claimed discrimination on the basis of race.282
The Zubulake opinions dealt with plaintiff’s first request for production of documents
relating to “communication by or between UBS employees concerning Plaintiff,”
where plaintiff alleged gender-based discrimination.283 Both courts shifted costs
associated with these requests.284 Other courts have rejected cost shifting for first
requests, specifically noting that “defendant has produced no discovery to date.”285
In some instances, courts analyze specific categories of documents and label them
“critical,”
of
“grave
importance,”
or
“very important” and this weighs against cost shifting.286 In United States ex rel.
Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., the court distinguished between “important”
discovery and marginally relevant discovery.287 In adjudicating an alleged violation of
the ban on compensating university recruiters based on enrollment, the court ordered
production, without cost shifting, of the restoration of the tape that provided access to
email between recruiters and their supervisors and managers.288 It declined to order
production of email between recruiters.289
Yet, other courts shift the cost of discovery going to the heart of the dispute. The
class in Boeynaems alleged deceptive practices regarding termination of a health club
membership, and the court held that Plaintiffs must pay 100% of the cost of producing
“[c]orporate documents stating Defendant’s practices and policies applicable to . . .
cancellation of memberships.”290 In Multitechnology Services, L.P. v. Verizon
Southwest, the dispute centered on defendant’s refusal to pay access fees for customers
utilizing plaintiff’s phone network. Plaintiff propounded discovery that required
searching defendant’s database to confirm who those customers were, in order to
determine the scope of the dispute and the amount of damages, yet the court shifted

282 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
283 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
284 Id.; see also Cochran, 2014 WL 1608664, at *1; Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94,
111 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
285 Cochran, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 n.3 (emphasis added).
286 Id.; First Niagara Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Folino, 317 F.R.D. 23, 28 (E.D. Pa. 2016);
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250, 2017 WL 7520603, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19,
2017).
287 United States ex. rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 246–47 (S.D.
Cal. 2015).
288 Id. at 242.
289 Id.
290 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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half of the costs of the production.291 In these cases, courts identify discovery of
specific categories of highly relevant information, yet order cost shifting.
There is, once again, tremendous variability among the courts. In analyzing the
importance of the discovery in the dispute, some courts penalize litigants for not
knowing what is on unsearched sources of ESI; some do not. Some courts apply cost
shifting to requests for production seeking core discovery; some do not. Some courts
examine whether there is equivalent information more readily accessible; some
require only the same type of information from cheaper forms of discovery such as
depositions.
F. Whether the Burden Outweighs the Benefit
Most cases ultimately engage in a cost-benefit analysis. Yet, measuring costs
remains problematic. Courts vary widely in their analysis of the “total cost of
production.” Some courts consider the cost of the initial request; other courts consider
the cost of the request as modified after the parties meet and confer. Some courts
consider only the cost of producing the disputed discovery. Other courts consider the
total cost of the production to date. When examining the disputed discovery, some
courts consider only the cost of restoring and searching the data; others consider all
costs, including the cost of attorney review for responsiveness and privilege. In all
cases, there are valuation problems: the estimates are tools of advocacy.
1.

Cost of Production – Estimates as Advocacy

Whether one includes the total cost of discovery or only the cost of the disputed
discovery, whether one includes the cost of restoration and searching or the total cost
of production, courts are confronted with responding parties who have an incentive to
inflate costs to show burden and requesting parties with an incentive to do the
opposite. And both do so with abandon.
In Rowe, one defendant estimated the cost of cataloguing, restoring, and
processing eight backup tapes at $400,000; plaintiffs estimated the same defendant
could produce responsive information for as little as $24,000.292 Another Rowe
defendant estimated a cost of $403,000 to produce ESI responsive to plaintiffs’ first
request for production.293 Plaintiffs’ expert estimated they could produce the same ESI
for approximately $64,000.294
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., defendants estimated a cost of production in
the “millions of dollars.” Plaintiffs estimated as low as $183,500.295 In PSEG Power
New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., defendant estimated a cost of $206,000

291 Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702, 2004 WL
1553480, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No.
4:02-CV-702, 2004 WL 594112, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2004).
292 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
293 Id. at 426.
294 Id. at 427–28.
295 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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to reproduce its emails. Plaintiff estimated $37,500.296 In Escamilla v. SMS Holdings
Co., defendant estimated that restoration and searching of relevant backup tapes would
cost $36 million.297 Plaintiff’s expert estimated one to two percent of that total.298
Litigants estimate costs based on unrealistic assumptions like assuming “every
document on the existing database comes up with search terms,”299 or estimating costs
for “all of its offices nationwide . . . ignoring the fact that discovery has been limited
to only a small fraction of the 125 offices,”300 or estimating $1.2 – $3.6 million to
search all of defendant’s servers rather than searching the email of a few key
custodians,301 or assuming it will take six times longer to complete quality assurance
than it takes to complete the underlying task.302
In Boeynaems, when defendant objected to production of records from a database
containing records of member inquiries and complaints, it estimated a cost to produce
of $360,000.303 The court found, without analysis, that this represented “a very
elaborate and expensive undertaking.”304 The briefs showed that it required querying
a Microsoft SQL database.305 In a more recent example, the responding party
estimated as much as 300 employee hours to pull individual wage statements for
employees from a commercial payroll software. 306 The requesting party estimated
three hours if one used the software’s administrative functions to batch export the
296 PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
297 Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct.
21, 2011).
298 Id. at *9; see also Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(defendant estimated a cost of $49,000 to produce email contained on two hard drives; Plaintiff
estimated $27,000).
299 Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., No. 07-1078, 2010 WL 1381225, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2010).
300 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
301 Hock Foods, Inc. v. William Blair & Co., No. 09-2588, 2011 WL 884446, at *9 (D. Kan.
Mar. 11, 2011).
302 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306–07 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012).
303 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
304 Id.
305 Defendant’s Estimate of the Cost to Comply with the Discovery Plaintiffs Propose at 3,
Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 10-CV-2326), ECF
No. 58; Transcript of Ben Deposition at 18, Boeynaems, 285 F.R.D. 331 (No. 10-CV-2326),
ECF No. 58-1.
306 Brum v. MarketSource, Inc., No. 17-CV-241, 2018 WL 3861558, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
14, 2018); Further Joint Statement Re Discovery Disagreement in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Compel Defendant to Serve Responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories and Requests for
Production, Set One at 16, Brum, 2018 WL 3861558 (No. 17-CV-241), ECF No. 46 [hereinafter
Joint Statement on Discovery Disagreement].
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statements.307 In another recent case, defendant estimated a cost of $3.125 million to
produce relevant information from a database of consumer credit files.308 It assumed
eight hours to review each file.309 The court noted the record contained an alternative
estimate of two minutes per file, which would reduce the cost of review to
$12,500.25.310
For decades, courts have stated that “the expense and burden to the responding
party should not only be balanced against the relative expense and burden to the
requesting party, but such should be scrutinized for possible excessiveness.”311 At this
point, if the courts inquire, they routinely find cost estimates are “greatly
exaggerated”312 or “overblown.”313 The problem is that courts often do not make the
inquiry.314
2.

Cost of Production – Who Does What Work?

Some courts recognize that the cost of the discovery is, in large part, driven by the
choice of vendor. Zubulake was one of the first, finding that UBS had complete control
over selection of the vendor and noting the possibility that a less-expensive vendor
could have been found.315 In Wiginton and Clean Harbors, the courts again found that
the ability to control costs “pivots around the selection of the vendor.”316
Nowhere is the significance of that choice more apparent than in the small value
cases where litigants choose high-dollar vendors and then claim undue burden. In
Haka, discussed above, the defendant argued it would cost $60,000 to search and
produce email and other routine ESI from two hard drives. 317 Defendant valued the
case at less than six figures, and the court found “fairness and efficiency” required the
parties to split the cost. In shifting costs, the court noted defendant’s estimates, but not
307 Joint Statement on Discovery Disagreement supra note 306, at 8, 10.
308 Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020 WL
1689708, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020).
309 Id.
310 Id. at *6 n.7.
311 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463 (D. Utah 1985).
312 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3–4 (D. Kan. July
21, 2009).
313 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
314 See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text.
315 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
316 Clean Harbors Env’t Servs. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL 1897213, at *5;
Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
317 Affidavit of Saul C. Glazer in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel at 4, Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (No. 06-CV-0594-C), ECF No. 42 [hereinafter Glazer Affidavit]; see also
Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578.
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the specifics.318 The county government defendant proposed outsourcing the search to
a multi-national vendor, with the largest portion of the costs relating to creating TIFF
images and a load file for all documents returned in the keyword search.319 Plaintiff
estimated half the cost, $27,000.320
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., plaintiffs sought
$120,000 in damages.321 Defendant estimated the cost of production at around
$121,000.322 Defendant argued that discovery from nineteen email PST files for
nineteen custodians was unduly burdensome and should be precluded or the costs
shifted.323 The court agreed and precluded discovery unless plaintiff agreed to “absorb
the incredible expense” associated with the requests.324 Defendant’s estimate came
from a multi-national eDiscovery vendor, with separate charges for collection,
processing, hosting, and other fees, including creating TIFF images of all documents
to be reviewed.325
In Couch v. Wan, the California Attorney General’s Office found it did not have
the resources available to search 140 gigabytes of active data previously collected
from sixteen hard drives.326 It would need to hire a vendor, at an estimated cost of

318 Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578–79.
319 Id. at 578.
320 Id. at 579; Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production
of Documents and to Compel Search of Backup Tape Drive at 11, Haka, 246 F.R.D. 577 (No.
06-CV-00594), ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Haka Protective Order]. The Sedona Conference
Glossary defines TIFF images as: “A widely used and supported graphic file format for storing
bit-mapped images, with many different compression formats and resolutions.” A load file
“relates to a set of scanned images or electronically processed files, and that indicates where
individual pages or files belong together as documents, to include attachments, and where each
document begins and ends. A load file may also contain data relevant to the individual
documents, such as selected metadata, coded data, and extracted text. The Sedona Conference
Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263,
332, 377–78 (2020).
321 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11-CV-0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Complaint for Breach of Contract; Quantum Meruit; Unjust
Enrichment at 8, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846 (No. 11-CV-0788).
322 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *1; Declaration of Saeid Ahmadian in
Support of Supplemental Brief Regarding Cost of E-Mail Production at 8, Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 2013 WL 485846 (No. ll-CV-0788), ECF No. 41-1 [hereinafter Ahmadian Declaration].
323 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *1. The Sedona Conference Glossary
defines a PST file as “[a] Microsoft Outlook email storage file containing archived email
messages in a compressed format. The Sedona Conference Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital
Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263, 357 (2020).
324 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2013 WL 485846, at *4.
325 Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 6.
326 Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

45

394

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:349

$54,000,327 based on an estimated “industry rate of $275 per hour.”328 The court
concluded, as a result, that Plaintiffs’ discovery requests warranted cost shifting.329
Compare these responses with Semsroth v. City of Wichita, where plaintiffs sought
production of email from 117 email accounts from a back-up tape.330 Defendant
proposed to restore the tape in-house using its Exchange server and sought to shift the
costs of keyword searching the 117 restored PST files either manually or by
purchasing an off-the-shelf product to search them.331 Defendant estimated the cost of
the former at $1,950 and the latter at $2,624.95, and the costs associated with restoring
and searching the email in-house at $50 an hour.332
So, the cost is either $275 an hour or $50 an hour, depending. Email can be
searched in-house for $2,000 or with a vendor for $121,000, depending. Should
proportionality and cost-shifting determinations depend on which government agency
plaintiff sues, and how technologically savvy its attorneys are? Does it pay to just
throw up your hands and hire the most expensive vendor you can find if you are filing
a proportionality or cost-shifting motion? The standard for discovery is
reasonableness, not perfection.333 The exception comes when parties are choosing a
means to produce ESI in the context of a cost-shifting or proportionality motion.
3.

Cost of Production – Choice of Process

Principle 6 of the Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary on the Use of
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E–Discovery states unequivocally that
the “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies,
and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically
stored information.”334 And the courts generally find that the party in possession of
the data is best able to control the costs of discovery.335 But if a responding party seeks

327 Id. at *3–4.
328 Declaration of Sean Cotulla in Support of Motion to Modify Subpoenas at 2, Couch, 2011
WL 2551546 (No. 08-CV-1621).
329 Couch, 2011 WL 2551546, at *4.
330 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 632 (D. Kan. 2006).
331 Id. at 632–33.
332 Id. at 633.
333 Agerbrink v. Model Serv. LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7841, 2017 WL 933095, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2017) (“The standard for evaluating discovery is reasonableness, not perfection.”);
Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require perfection.”).
334 See Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use
of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E–Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 193
(2007).
335 See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Illiana
Surgery & Med. Ctr. LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 07 CV 3, 2014 WL 1094455, at *14
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2014).
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to have the court preclude or shift the costs of discovery, should that presumption
change?
The issue shows up repeatedly in the case law with courts rubber-stamping the
producing party’s form of production. In many cases, where litigants oppose discovery
on the grounds of undue burden, significant costs arise from protocols that require
production of static images of each electronic file produced.
Producing parties commonly prefer to produce ESI as static images, usually TIFF
or PDF images, instead of in their native format because static images facilitate control
over the information.336 Static images readily permit bates stamping, redaction, and
marking documents confidential.337 But that control comes at a cost. According to
some, converting ESI from its native form “injects needless expense.”338
One defendant in Rowe estimated it would cost $403,000 to produce ESI
responsive to plaintiffs’ request.339 Of that amount, $126,000 was attributable to the
cost of creating TIFF images.340 Of the $121,183.65 that defendant estimated in
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., $54,120 of “the incredible expense” that the
court shifted to plaintiff was attributable to TIFF conversion and “image endorsing.”341
In Haka, of the defendant’s $60,000 estimated cost, the largest portion of the costs,
$27,000, related to creating the TIFF images and a load file for all documents returned
in the keyword search. 342 In Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, creating TIFF images
added $38,000 to the $82,500 charged by defendant’s vendor to process the requested
email.343 In United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., creating TIFF
336 The Sedona Conference defines “native format” as an electronic document with its
“associated file structure defined by the original creating application. The Sedona Conference
Glossary: eDiscovery & Digital Information Management, Fifth Ed., 21 SEDONA CONF. J. 263,
340 (2020). See supra note 320 defining TIFF images.
337 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 246–47 (S.D. Cal.
2015); see also CRAIG BALL, LAWYER’S GUIDE TO PRODUCTION 21 (2014),
http://www.craigball.com/Lawyers%20Guide%20to%20Forms%20of%20Production_Ver.201
40512_TX.pdf.
338 BALL, supra note 337, at 28 (explaining that converting native files to static images
requires (1) retaining a vendor to convert and emboss Bates stamps (2) generating load files
containing extracted text and metadata from the native ESI; (3) producing multiple copies of
spreadsheets and other file types that are difficult to image; (4) paying vendors more to ingest
and host the images and load files because they are larger in size than the native files); see also,
e.g., Thorton v. Morgan Stanley, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *1 (N.D. Okla.
May 3, 2013) (“Defendants estimated $91,337 to produce ESI, $37,399 less if it produced native
files.”).
339 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
340 Id.
341 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11-CV-0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013); Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 6.
342 Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
343 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *2 (D. Kan. July
21, 2009).
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images increased the cost of production from $83,700 to $358,209, depending on the
number of backup tapes restored. 344
If creating static images can add $358,209 in United States ex rel. Carter and
double the cost of production in Haka or Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., is
there undue burden or undue cost shifting? Courts have found producing TIFF images
a “reasonable” form of production,345 but, for most commonly used productivity
software, there are also well-established, alternative protocols for production of ESI
in native file format.346
There are choices along the way, of which form of production is but one. In one
case study on collecting mobile ESI, an expert estimated the cost of collection from
the mobile devices used by fifty-three sales representatives ranged from $30,000 to
$60,000, depending on whether the party engaged local forensic examiners or not.347
In the alternative, the parties could utilize free, off-the-shelf tools to collect the most
commonly used files from mobile devices in-house and save $30,000 to $60,000.348
In another case, the court gave the parties a choice: split the $20,000 costs for
defendant to purchase forensic software to view forensic images obtained by plaintiff,
or plaintiff could set up a work station, with the necessary software, and allow
defendant to review the information on-site.349 There are usually choices to make
between collecting the main sources of information and collecting it all; between an
expensive process and one that requires more cooperation.
Courts have long held that needless costs should not be part of a proportionality or
cost-shifting analysis. In 1986, Delozier v. First National Bank of Gatlinburg stated
plainly that “[a] court will not shift the burden of discovery . . . where the costliness
of the discovery procedure involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s recordkeeping scheme over which the plaintiff has no control.”350 While the court in Delozier
addressed the burdens of production from microfilm, the same rationale applies to ESI.
In short, the courts do not consistently evaluate the estimates provided and the
work proposed. The question remains, should a party be able to utilize a high-cost
process, and then claim “extraordinary cost” and undue burden in responding to the
requested discovery?

344 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 229, 244 (S.D.
Cal. 2015); see also Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Haka
Protective Order, supra note 320, at 11.
345 Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. at 244.
346 BALL, supra note 337, at App. 2.
347
Craig
Ball,
Custodian-Directed
Preservation
of
iPhone
Content,
http://www.craigball.com/mobile_preservation_method_FINAL.pdf 3–4 (last visited Feb. 21,
2019).
348 Id.
349 Robotic Parking Sys., Inc. v. City of Hoboken, No. 06-3419, 2010 WL 324524, at *10
(D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2010).
350 Delozier v. First Nat'l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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Cost of Production – The Costs of Review

Nowhere is this inconsistency more evident than in disputes regarding the cost of
review. In many cases, burden is defined by review.351 In Rowe, one defendant
estimated costs between $40,000–$80,000 to produce the requested email, and an
estimated cost of $247,000 to then review for privilege and work-product.352 In
Zubulake, the defendant estimated costs of $165,000 to search for and restore
responsive information, with an additional expense of $107,000 for attorney and
paralegal review costs.353
The discrepancy is often greater. In Shevlin v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., the
responding party estimated $3,000 – $4,500 to search for and retrieve ESI, and
$250,000 – $300,000 to review it.354 In Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,
the responding party estimated $605,000 to restore ESI, and $16.5 – $70 million to
review it.355 In General Electric Co. v. Wilkins, the responding party estimated $2.1
million to restore, and $16 – $24 million to review.356 More recently, in United States
ex rel. Carter, defendant estimated the cost of restoration and indexing at $263,000,
and the cost of attorney review at $1.4 million.357 Adding the cost of review can
multiply the cost 100 times and increase it by millions of dollars.358 Should that cost
shift?
In Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin held that “where cost-shifting is appropriate, only
the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted,”359 but “the responding party
should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has
351 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at 41.
352 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
353 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
354 Shevlin v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 09-6323, 2012 WL 1981793, at *1 (D.N.J. June 1,
2012).
355 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. Tenn.
2003).
356 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-CV-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
2012).
357 Declaration of Michael Marks in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Brief re
Production of Documents from Backup Tapes at 9, United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint
Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:10-cv-01401), ECF No. 68-1[hereinafter
Marks Declaration]; United States ex rel. Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 229, 244.
358 In Johnson v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., the court assumed adding the cost of
review would add $91.6 million to the cost of producing 6.7 million documents. Johnson v.
Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., No. 14-cv-2081, 2017 WL 9516243, at *8 n.11 (D. Minn.
Mar. 3, 2017).
359 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Judge Scheindlin further explained: “Restoration . . . is the act of making inaccessible material
accessible. That ‘special purpose’ or ‘extraordinary step’ should be the subject of cost-shifting.
Search costs should also be shifted because they are so intertwined with the restoration process.”
Id.
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been converted to an accessible form.”360 She offered two reasons: the responding
party “unilaterally decides on the review protocol,” and “has the exclusive ability to
control the cost of reviewing the documents” by deciding who does the review.361
Some courts, including Rowe, have implemented protocols eliminating attorney
review prior to production, or, in the alternative, if the producing party elects to review
in advance requiring the producing party pay the costs of that review.362
Other courts include the cost of attorney review, but on a limited basis, shifting the
additional costs as “fairness dictates” and as “equitable” if plaintiffs elect to pursue
discovery of redundant or marginally relevant sources of information.363 Others are
more expansive, considering the entire cost of attorney review or, in some instances,
the entire cost of the production. The court in Adair v. EQT Production Co., citing its
authority to limit discovery when the burden outweighs its likely benefit, held:
[T]he court may consider the cost of review of ESI for privileged or
responsive information in deciding whether discovery imposes an undue
burden . . . Furthermore, if the court were inclined to limit discovery based
on the burden or cost of the review, I hold that the court could shift the costs
of that review, either in whole or in part, to the requesting party.364
Some courts add to the cost of review all costs attributable to producing the ESI,
including the cost of “searches, negotiations, document review, copying, including
time devoted by law firm employees and client employees.”365 United States ex rel.
Carter added filtering, de-duping and hosting costs of $6 million and production costs
of $360,000, raising the estimate to a total of $8.3 million.366
The result is that, in a case like United States ex rel. Carter, if one follows the
Zubulake standard, one considers whether $263,000 constitutes an undue burden. If
one follows the courts considering review costs, the amount jumps to $1.6 million,
and if one considers the total cost of production, one considers approximately $8.3

360 Id.
361 Id.
362 In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR (Saxagliptin & Metformin) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 18-MD-2809-KCC, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ky. May 26, 2020); Hudson v. AIH
Receivable Mgmt. Servs., No. 10-2287, 2011 WL 1402224, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2011);
Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
363 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,
2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,
229 F.R.D. 550, 562 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
364 Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 31,
2012); see also Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); Rodriguez–Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44
(D.P.R. 2010).
365 See Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10-cv-00068, 2012 WL 528224, at *5 (D.
Nev. Feb. 17, 2012); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
366 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 229, 244 (S.D.
Cal. 2015); Marks Declaration, supra note 357, at 9.
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million, a sum thirty times larger. As with other factors, there is tremendous variability
in how the courts define burden.
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs
Finally, both Rowe and Zubulake specifically examine the parties’ “relative ability
. . . to control costs and its incentive to do so.”367 The proportionality rule does not
expressly consider this factor, but there is a question of control inherent in the
consideration of “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit.”368 So, it is worth examining here.
The courts are uniform in finding that if the responding party created the problem
and attendant costs, the responding party pays for it. This is so whether the additional
expense is caused inadvertently or intentionally. Where a vendor inadvertently
separates attachments from emails, basic fairness requires the responding party to pay
to re-produce the information.369 Where defendant collects hard drives, but doesn’t
index them, it bears the cost of producing user logs.370 Where a party converts to
inaccessible format information that is likely to be requested in reasonably foreseeable
litigation, it may not shift the costs of restoring and searching the data.371 If a party
wipes a hard drive during pending litigation, it will bear the cost of the forensic
search.372 In short, when the burden and expense of the discovery is “self-inflicted”
the courts have little difficulty with the cost-shifting analysis. 373
Control over costs and incentives get murky beyond that. A review of the case law,
however, highlights one area almost all courts confront. Litigants routinely argue that
the requesting party failed to control costs by limiting the scope of its request:374
367 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429.
368 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
369 PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 05-cv-657, 2007 WL 2687670,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
370 Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., No. CIV 09-0885,
2010 WL 4928866, at *5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010).
371 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[I]f a party creates its own
burden or expense by converting into an inaccessible format data that it should have reasonably
foreseen would be discoverable material at a time when it should have anticipated litigation,
then it should not be entitled to shift the costs of restoring and searching the data.”); see also
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *10 (D. Minn. Oct. 21,
2011); Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 159 (“Principle
3: Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a party’s action or inaction should be weighed
against that party.”).
372 Escamilla, 2011 WL 5025254, at *5.
373 Id.
374 Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767, 2013 WL 5338427, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2013); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011 WL
1897213, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011).
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Medtronic points out that Michelson has nearly unfettered ability to control costs
by limiting the scope of his discovery requests. The court agrees and finds that this
factor weighs in favor of Michelson bearing part of the production cost.375
According to McPeek, “American lawyers engaged in discovery have never been
accused of asking for too little. To the contrary, like the Rolling Stones, they hope that
if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need.”376 Courts find the
requesting party has every incentive to ask for overly broad discovery and little
incentive not to. Some scholars agree: “the extent of a party’s discovery costs are
determined not by the litigant himself but by the scope and content of the request filed
by his opponent.”377
Most courts attempt to sort discovery narrowly tailored to find relevant
information from discovery that is not, preserving the presumption that the responding
party pays for the former. The first factor that Zubulake examines is “the extent to
which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information.”378 Rowe
inquires of “the specificity of the discovery requests” and the “the likelihood of
discovering critical information.”379 McPeek examines the “marginal utility” of the
request.380 The 2006 Advisory Committee factors examine the “specificity of the
discovery request” and “predictions as to the importance . . . of the further
information.”381 Even those cases focused on “fairness” look to whether the request is
narrowly tailored criticizing, for example, the breath of the search terms selected.382
The inquiry makes sense. If one of the fundamental purposes of civil litigation is a
“just” determination of the action,383 then examining whether the discovery requests
are aimed at uncovering evidence directly relating to disputed facts should be a
priority. It is the variability in the analysis, however, that limits its utility.
As a starting point, courts uniformly decry overbroad discovery. Some courts
preclude outright “[a]ny requests characterized by Plaintiffs as a demand for

375 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003);
see also Multitechnology Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-CV-702, 2004 WL 1553480, at
*1–2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004).
376 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33–34 (D.D.C 2001); see also Rowe Ent., Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002).
377 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 779.
378 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
379 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429–30 (“Where a party multiplies litigation costs by seeking
expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the expense.”).
380 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34.
381 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
382 See, e.g., Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D. 577, 578–79 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
383 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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production of “all” documents of a general category.”384 Other courts state that a claim
for any and all documents will “rarely suffice.”385 Commentary to the Sedona
Principles routinely discourages use of “[s]o-called ‘any and all’ discovery
requests.”386
But the courts vary as to what is acceptable. Some courts find requests
“appropriately tailored” simply because the email and word processing documents are
“the likely source of information.”387 Some courts find requests reasonably specific if
they are limited to searching for ESI relating to the plaintiff.388
Other courts reject such limitations.389 Some courts analyze search terms, finding
certain search criteria “appropriately fashioned” and, hence, the specificity
requirement met.390 Conversely, they shift the costs of producing ESI where the
requesting party goes beyond a reasonable number of search terms and sources or the
estimated production is “clearly voluminous.”391
Other courts find requests narrowly tailored where the parties have agreed to
search terms and time frames.392 Some courts require requesting parties to narrow their
search terms unilaterally.393 Others have required an iterative process and information
exchange regarding search terms and sources, and then shifted a portion of the costs
for discovery beyond an agreed threshold.394
384 Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 343 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
385 United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 238–39 (S.D. Cal.
2015).
386 SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, at Comment 3(a) (2d ed.
2007). See also The Sedona Conference, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2) Primer:
Practice Pointers for Responding to Discovery Requests, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 447, 464, 467,
469, 484 (2018); Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121.
387 Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
388 Johnson v. Neiman, No. 4:09CV00689, 2010 WL 4065368, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18,
2010).
389 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R. 2010).
390 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., No. 97-CV-00635, at *6 (E.D.
Wis. Dec. 27, 2004), ECF No. 173.
391 Hoist Fitness Sys., Inc. v. TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL
121195, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019); see also Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 11CV-00991, 2013 WL 1310216, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Cannata v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., No. 10-CV-00068, 2012 WL 528224, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2012).
392 Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 13-CV-2584, 2014 WL 2094340, at
*10 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-309, 2009 WL 3446761, at
*3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010).
393 Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
394 Remy, 2013 WL 1310216, at *7; Cannata, 2012 WL 528224, at *4.
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The leading cases look for well-defined parameters: lists of custodians, sources,
and time frames, following a meaningful meet and confer process. Zubulake found
plaintiff’s request for “[a]ll documents concerning any communication by or between
UBS employees concerning Plaintiff,” as subsequently narrowed to five employees
during a twenty-nine month period to be “a relatively limited and targeted request.”395
The court in Cochran v. Caldera Medical, Inc. found requests seeking specific
categories of data that the defendant was required by law to maintain were “narrowly
tailored.”396 In Juster Acquisition Co. v. North Hudson Sewerage Authority, the court
found requests narrowly tailored where they were limited to requests for ESI from
identified actors involved in the transaction and “a reasonable and restricted” time
period during which the parties were in negotiation.397
In contrast, where the defendant in Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson
had not “specifically limited his requests by date” despite an apparent understanding
of the three year period most likely to have relevant information, the court found this
factor weighed in favor of cost shifting.398 Similarly, Rowe looked for limitations, such
as requesting email from only specific persons or seeking information about specific
data sets, and finding none found plaintiffs requests “extremely broad.”399 Lawson
looked for limited numbers of custodians and terms tailored to the custodians, and
found “really broad search terms that end up in ridiculous numbers of unresponsive
documents.”400
Taken individually, the courts vary dramatically in how they define a narrowly
tailored request. Taken as whole, one finds best practices. In defining specificity, some
courts look for identification of a limited number of key custodians,401 sources of

395 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
396 Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22,
2014).
397 Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at
*4 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013).
398 Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 554–55 (W.D. Tenn.
2003); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 570048, at *5–6 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
399 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429–30 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
400 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *4
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020).
401 See, e.g., Crown Castle USA Inc. v. Fred A. Nudd Corp., No. 05-CV-6163, 2010 WL
4027780 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010); Siani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Farmingdale, No. CV09407, 2010 WL 3170664, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010).
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ESI,402 a defined time period,403 with reasonably tailored subject matter inquiries or
keywords.404 The problem is that not all courts follow their lead.
V. INCREASING OBJECTIVITY
This Part offers proposals that will reduce, though admittedly not eliminate, the
remarkable subjectivity found in the cost-shifting case law. In general terms, it
proposes three steps, all of which can be readily implemented through discovery
orders: First, interpret the above factors to require verifiable information—make them
objective measures. Second, mandate cooperation, in the form of disclosure of
information, before cost shifting, and penalize its absence in the cost-shifting analysis.
Finally, if the courts shift costs, share control over the process or limit those costs.
Aligning abilities and incentives to control costs requires more than a single-minded
focus on making sure the requesting party has “skin in the game.” It requires creating
incentives to reduce costs rather than strategically inflate them.
A. Defining the Importance of the Issues
The courts can readily restore a measure of objectivity to their analysis of the
importance of the issues. In examining this factor, one can simply ask, will the case
impact more than the named litigants? 405 With employment discrimination, is the
alleged discrimination limited to the named plaintiff or is it widespread? Will the
proposed injunctive relief affect one person, e.g. reinstatement, or many, e.g., banning
a workplace policy that discriminates on the basis of race or gender? Is the civil rights
litigation about compensating a named party for a harm, or will it potentially change
a law affecting many? In products liability litigation, does the injury arise from a
manufacturing defect that affected only the named parties, or a design defect that
potentially impacts the safety of many? In a dissolution of marriage, is the discovery
about divvying up assets or custody of children?
It is a standard that is easy to apply. It is also a standard that, in many cases, will
result in the factor favoring the traditional presumption that the producing party bears
the costs. Yet, there is logic to safeguarding that presumption where the discovery will
affect the many as opposed to the few.406
In analyzing the amount in controversy, courts and scholars have recognized that
there “may be substantial external benefits to the general litigation in question; thus,

402 See, e.g., Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 10-CV-0068, 2012 WL 528224,
at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 17, 2012).
403 See, e.g., Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 98.
404 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel Soto v. City of Buffalo, 334 F.R.D. 23, 31
(W.D.N.Y. 2019).
405 Other commentators have referenced fee-shifting statutes as a means to identify public
interest litigation in the course of arguing for a user-pays system with government funding of
discovery in litigation of broader societal importance. Redish & McNamara, supra note 8 at
815.
406 Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976), with Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1691, 1718 (2014).
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discovery costs that seem exorbitant when only the instant litigants are considered can,
in context, be justifiable.”407 Some private rights of action may deter unsafe or
unlawful conduct. Other rights of action simply divide stakes.408 This distinction
applies with equal force to the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation and
can be used to objectively define importance.
It is not that gender discrimination was an important issue for Judge Francis in his
decision in Chen Oster but not for Judge Scheindlin in her decision in Zubulake. The
real issue is that the discrimination affected one person in Zubulake and a workplace
in Chen Oster.409 The real question to ask in analyzing this factor is, will the case
impact more than the named litigants?
B. Defining the Amount in Controversy
This “most objective” of factors defies objective application because courts are
confronted with either estimates as advocacy or silence. The courts are left to paint
with broad strokes deciding whether the case is “a nuisance value case,” or not, and
whether the discovery “seems” excessive, or not. There can be no certainty in the
amount in controversy before final judgment, but there are means to value a case early.
Attorneys do it all the time. The solution proposed here is to make them do it in the
cost-shifting motion and response.
Pursuant to Rule 11, plaintiffs must have a reasonable basis in fact and law for the
ad damnum they state in their complaint.410 Courts could require them to provide such
basis in their cost-shifting briefs. Defendants must have a reasonable basis for
admitting or denying the ad damnum. Courts could require them to disclose this in
their briefs. For both parties, courts could require substantiated estimates or weigh
litigants’ silence against them in deciding proportionality or cost-shifting motions.
Providing objective bases for this factor requires reference to other cases.
Comparisons, whether in real estate or litigation, offer imperfect information, but
better than no information. Litigants reference comparable cases in settlement
discussions. The same can be done in a cost-shifting analysis. For some cases,
attorneys could substantiate estimates by reference to jury verdict reporters. For
complex litigation, there is data. Litigation analytics now estimate jury awards and
settlement values in commercial litigation (the largest of all federal practice areas),
class actions, antitrust cases, intellectual property, MDL litigation, securities, trade

407 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1112; see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery: Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV.
LITIG. 647, 654 (2015) (“[T]here is danger that case-by-case cost–benefit calculations will give
short shrift to those elements of the analysis that. . . are difficult to quantify— in particular,
social benefits.”).
408 Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 1102. Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No.
18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *11 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (“the breach-ofcontract claim here does not implicate any broader societal impact. This is a case between
private parties seeking money damages.”).
409 Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), with Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
410 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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secrets, ERISA cases, and other areas.411 There is objective information that the courts
could require to substantiate claims regarding compensatory damages.
Equally important, there is objective information that the courts could require to
evaluate the other remedies sought. While the “amount in controversy” factor
encourages litigants and the courts to focus on claims for compensatory damages,412
injunctive relief may come closest to making an injured party whole.413 Courts
routinely place a value on requests for injunctive relief to determine subject matter
jurisdiction in diversity cases: they do so by assessing the value of the injunction to
the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant.414 Courts could do the same in cost-shifting
cases.
In short, courts should require more than unsubstantiated speculation regarding the
amount in controversy and silence as to the value of other remedies requested. There
is proof, albeit imperfect, that a court could require that would add objectivity. Doing
so will not eliminate the subjectivity inherent in weighing this factor against the cost
of production, but requiring a substantiated estimate for both compensatory and noncompensatory remedies and, absent that weighing the factor against the litigant,
promises better information than the silence commonly offered. Few cases are truly
sui generis. The question to ask here is, what do comparable cases suggest regarding
the amount in controversy and the importance of non-monetary remedies?
C. Defining the Parties’ Relative Access to Information
In Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the court set
out an objective standard to be applied when defining the parties’ relative access to
information: whether a key player possessed “relevant, unique information.”415 This
standard recognizes that the inquiry is, as set out in Rowe and Zubulake, an inquiry
into whether the same information, i.e., the same document or file, is more readily
obtained from another source.
If the inquiry is about whether the same ESI exists elsewhere, there is an objective
answer, one that can be validated with a hash value. Once the inquiry becomes a
411 Kirk Jenkins, Making Sense of the Litigation Analytics Revolution, CAL. SUP. CT. REV.
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.californiasupremecourtreview.com/2017/10/making-sense-of-thelitigation-analytics-revolution/; Jay W. Belle Isle, Lex Machina Expands Award-Winning Legal
Analytics Platform to Commercial Litigation, LEGAL READER (June 21, 2017),
https://www.legalreader.com/lex-machina-expands-analytics-platform/.
412 Compare Complaints and Judicial Decisions in Haka v. Lincoln Cnty., 246 F.R.D 577
(W.D. Wis. 2007), and Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40 (D.P.R.
2010), with Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL 2551546 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011).
413 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG.
99 (2007); Tracy A. Thomas, Switching to Prophylactic Injunctions, 90 TEX. L. REV. 295, 297
(2012).
414 See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc'ns & Elecs., Inc., 120
F.3d 216, 218 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Because [plaintiff] sought only declaratory and injunctive
relief amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.”); McCarty
v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979); 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE § 3703 (4th ed. 2020).
415 Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017).
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question of whether the same type of information is more readily available, i.e.,
whether depositions offer a reasonable substitute, the inquiry becomes a subjective
one, with some courts saying yes and some saying no.
Attorneys in the Enron litigation stated over a decade ago, “when you’ve got the
emails, people remember lots and lots of things.”416 Attorneys today recognize that
discovery of social media precedes, and is not replaced by, plaintiff’s deposition in the
personal injury case. The better reasoned judicial decisions recognize the unique value
of ESI—that parties should not be required to forgo written discovery because the
same subject can be addressed in a deposition. These courts interpret both factors
relating to relative access and availability from other sources objectively to ask
whether the same ESI is available elsewhere.
As suggested in the Advisory Committee Notes, this factor is about information
asymmetry.417 As shown in the cases, information asymmetry can be objectively
defined at the file level. The question to ask here is, does one party have access to
“relevant, unique” ESI?
D. Defining the Parties’ Resources
In defining resources, the better reasoned decisions again limit their inquiry to an
objective determination of the parties’ resources. They do not consider concentric
circles of potentially expanding resources.
The standard first articulated in Rowe and now the plain language of revised Rule
26(b)(1) supports this limitation. As a starting point, Rule 26 examines “the parties’
resources.”418 The rule does not provide for examination of “the resources available to
each party” as suggested in Zubulake.419 The rule does use the plural possessive
suggesting a comparison of both parties’ resources. Applying the plain language of
the rule supports the more limited, verifiable interpretation given this factor by courts
that decline to consider the resources of plaintiff’s counsel.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendments support this
interpretation as well. The original language in the rule examined the “limitations on
the parties’ resources,” and the Committee notes explained that this factor sought to
address discovery that is disproportionate given “the limitations on a financially weak
litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to
discovery requests.”420 The Committee’s focus is on the “financially weak litigant,”
not the financially weak litigant, as aided by counsel.
Courts that go beyond this to consider the resources of counsel or other third parties
raise intractable issues. What is the basis for examining only the resources of the
requesting party, typically the plaintiff, as some courts do and some scholars
416 Peter Geier, A Defense Win in the Heart of “Enron Country”; Use of an E-mail Trail
Helps a Jury Acquit an Energy Trading Executive.; Houston, NAT. L.J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 2.
417 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendments.
418 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
419 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002)).
420 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7

58

2021]

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING

407

advocate?421 If courts do include as “available resources” those of plaintiffs’ counsel
or third-party litigation funding, does not fairness (and the plain language of the rule)
require consideration of the resources of defense counsel, insurance companies, and
related third parties? If so, how many law firms would agree to represent a client if
they knew that doing so would require them to consistently reveal their income and
net worth? What incentives would this create for those seeking counsel?
The better course, as seen in some of the opinions discussed above,422 is for the
courts to mandate substantive disclosures regarding the parties’ own resources.423
Tying this analysis to a concrete comparison of the parties’ individual resources
provides an objective, uniform measure. Individuals and small businesses submit
affidavits or other proof of income, liabilities, and assets, the same type of information
routinely produced in cases ranging from bankruptcy to dissolution of marriage.
Publicly traded companies submit audited financial statements and documentation
found in SEC filings, again information that is routinely generated and produced.
Litigants provide objective information regarding their resources, in cases large and
small. Courts could require the same in cost-shifting motions. The question to ask here
is, what do the parties’ submissions say about their own resources?424
E. Defining the Importance of the Discovery
1.

Sampling and “A Pig in a Poke”425

Donald Rumsfield infamously responded to a question about weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq by stating: “there are known knowns . . . there are known unknowns
. . . But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t
know.”426 Cost-shifting motions need not be based on known unknows or unknown
unknowns.

421 See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Intern., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Redish
& McNamara, supra note 8, at 821–22.
422 See supra notes 249–62.
423 In this context, party should be defined to include those who have assumed control over
the litigation because of a subrogation agreement or otherwise. See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit
AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *14 (D. Kan. June 18,
2020).
424 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 817, suggests “[p]erhaps the most feasible option
would involve a system similar to the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (“FAFSA”),
which takes account of all of an applicant's relevant financial data, including income, savings,
investments, and property. It then calculates, according to a predetermined formula, an
individual contribution representing the amount of money that the applicant can be reasonably
expected to contribute toward his education.”
425 See Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009) discussed supra
in text accompanying note 274.
426 News Briefing from U.S. Dep’t of Def., Sec’y Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002).
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Sampling is an established means to assess the importance of the discovery. It does
not offer perfect information, but it does offer some objective information.427 The
problem is: some courts require it;428 others do not.429
The leading cases have long recognized the importance of sampling. In McPeek,
the court “decided to take small steps and perform, as it were, a test run.”430 The court
ordered restoration of email from the most important fact witness for a one-year
period.431 Zubulake emphasized that “[w]hen based on an actual sample . . . [t]here
will also be tangible evidence of the time and cost required.”432 In doing so, “the entire
cost-shifting analysis can be grounded in fact rather than guesswork.”433
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Proportionality encourages sampling.
Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in determining whether the requested
discovery is sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or expense of its
production.434 The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation suggests that courts
“[r]equire sampling of ESI that a party has been requested to produce from sources it
deems not reasonably accessible, thus enabling the judge to ascertain the extent to

427 See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting
the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 69–75
(2007); see also Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., No. 16-CV-00193, 2017 WL 1737723
(D. Idaho May 3, 2017); Michael Levine et al., EDRM Statistical Sampling Applied to
Electronic Discovery, EDRM, https://edrm.net/resources/project-guides/edrm-statisticalsampling-applied-to-electronic-discovery/ (last updated Feb. 18, 2015).
428 See, e.g., Brum v. MarketSource, Inc., No. 17-CV-241, 2018 WL 3861558, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (ordering sampling); City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., 326
F.R.D. 489, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. 14-12719, 2017 WL
85832, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2017); Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth.,
No. Civ.A. 12-3427, 2013 WL 541972, at *3–6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013); United States ex rel.
Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 233–34 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Wilkins, No. 10-cv-00674, 2012 WL 2376940 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2012); Kipperman v. Onex,
260 F.R.D. 682, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp.,
222 F.R.D. 594, 602–03 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217
F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
429 See, e.g., CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 17-CV-80495, 2018 WL 6843629, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 21, 2018) (shifting costs after parties failed to reach agreement regarding sampling
protocol); Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 2010)
(simply finding the requested discovery “too high of a cost . . . in this type of action.”).
430 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
431 Id.
432 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
433 Id.; see also Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
3288058, at *7 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020); Kipperman, 260 F.R.D. at 691; King Pharm., Inc. v.
EON Labs, Inc., No. 04-CV-5540, 2008 WL 11427890, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2008);
Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 602–03.
434 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 64–65.
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which relevant information resides within the ESI and the cost of retrieval of the entire
data set.”435
But many litigants and courts do not heed the advice. Courts instead criticize the
requesting party for offering “pure conjecture” or “no idea” what the disputed ESI
may hold.436 When courts deny discovery or shift its costs because the requesting party
has not proven the disputed discovery contains new, relevant information, the courts
speculate that the untapped source does not contain new, relevant information and
ignore the burden of proof. Assuming a threshold showing of relevancy by the
requesting party, well-established law provides that the moving party has the burden
of establishing undue burden.437 Courts that find the requesting party offers nothing
more than speculation without sampling the data in question flip that burden.
Sampling does not bring certainty: it is biased towards quantity, not quality.438
And sampling is difficult if there are few responsive documents in the collection, i.e.,
there is low richness or low prevalence.439 But those flaws can be addressed, at least
in part, with techniques such as stratified and cluster sampling. 440 There may also be
435 Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121, at 41.
436 Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,
2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010); Johnson v. Neiman, No. 09CV00689 AGF,
2010 WL 4065368, at *1–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010); see supra text accompanying notes 267–
69.
437 See, e.g., Black Love Resists in the Rust ex rel. Soto v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 334 F.R.D.
23, 28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); Seger v. Ernest-Spencer Metals, Inc., No. 08CV75, 2010 WL 378113,
at *3 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 2010); Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07–
2388, 2008 WL 3822773, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008).
438 Patricia Groot, Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with Limits
L.
&
TECH.
REV.
2,
30–31
(2009)
on
Abuse,
2009
DUKE
(“the numerical test is biased toward quantity rather than quality . . . [m]arginal utility cannot
measure the possibility of finding one key ‘smoking gun’”).
439 “Prevalence” or “richness” or “yield” rates are defined as “the fraction of Documents in
a Population that are Relevant to the Information Need.” Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V.
Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED. CT. L. REV.
1, 26 (2013). Regarding the difficulty of sampling with data sets containing low yield rates, see,
e.g., Michael Levine et al., EDRM Statistical Sampling Applied to Electronic Discovery, EDRM
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://edrm.net/resources/project-guides/edrm-statistical-sampling-appliedto-electronic-discovery/; William Webber, What is the Maximum Recall in re Biomet?,
E-DISCOVERY
(Apr.
24,
2013,
10:00
AM),
EVALUATING
http://blog.codalism.com/index.php/what-is-the-maximum-recall-in-re-biomet/#more-1808.
440 See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(stratified sampling “take[s] into account the heterogeneity of the population by dividing it into
subgroups that are each homogeneous with respect to the relevant variables, after which a
random sample would be drawn from each subgroup”); see also Mich. Dep’t of Educ. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 875 F.2d 1196, 1205 (6th Cir. 1989); Spears v. First Am. eAppraiseIT, No. C–
08–00868, 2012 WL 1438709, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); Feske v. MHC Thousand Trails
Ltd. P’ship, No. 11–CV–4124, 2012 WL 1123587, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012); Schafer v.
State Farm & Fire Cas. Co., No. 06–8262, 2009 WL 799978, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2009);
McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2004); Chavez v.
IBP, Inc., No. CV–01–5093, 2004 WL 5520002, at *10–11 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2004); Levine
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instances where sampling is not feasible, for example, where the principal cost of the
discovery is licensing the software or building the hardware to search archived ESI.
In such cases, the courts could require testimony and other evidence regarding the
contents of the data set in question. But in most instances, sampling of some form is
possible, and this Article argues that it should be presumptively part of each costshifting motion to provide an objective basis for evaluating the importance of the
discovery. Would it not make more sense to sample and decide, rather than have the
court speculate based on the parties’ speculation?
Well-reasoned judicial decisions acknowledge that the “pig in a poke” argument
is, to mix metaphors, a red herring. They acknowledge that litigants can estimate the
importance of the discovery, and the potential relevancy of an unsearched dataset,
through sampling and other discovery. While some courts omit this step, the law is
clear that the requesting party must demonstrate relevancy and the objecting party
must prove burden. Sampling provides evidence of both.
2.

Sampling and Prevalence Rates

Parties that have sampled the disputed ESI routinely argue that there are few
responsive documents in the data set and that this supports precluding or shifting the
costs of the discovery.441 The argument raises a second issue regarding the importance
of the discovery: prevalence rates and the inherent limitations of sampling with key
word search. “Prevalence” or “richness” or “yield” rates are defined as “the fraction
of Documents in a Population that are Relevant to an Information Need.”442 While the
terminology is clear, the minimum standards are not.
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., plaintiffs alleged sexual harassment in the
workplace. 443 At the court’s urging, plaintiffs selected a sample of three backup tapes
for restoration. Following restoration, the court concluded that “the percentage of
sexually objectionable e-mails is substantially lower than 4.5%.”444 The court held that
“because the search also revealed a significant number of unresponsive documents . .
. the marginal utility test weighs slightly in favor of cost-shifting.”445 In United States
ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., the court found a two percent responsive rate too low
and required the relator to narrow its request and then assume half the costs of
defendant’s production.446 Similarly, in Quinby v. West LB AG, another gender
discrimination case, the court analyzed the number of relevant email obtained from a
et al., supra note 427; MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS
257–60 (2d ed. 2001).
441 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574 (N.D. Ill. 2004);
Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States ex rel. Garbe v.
Kmart Corp., Case No. 12-CV-881, 2014 WL 12787823, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014).
442 Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of
Technology Assisted Review, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013).
443 Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 570.
444 Id. at 571, 575. Plaintiffs argued it was 21.3%; defendants argued that it was 1.64%. Id.
445 Id. at 575.
446 Garbe, 2014 WL 12787823, at *1.
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sample backup tape.447 The court found that the number was “quite low when
compared to the volume of documents produced,” and required plaintiff assume thirty
percent of the cost.448 Some courts have required that the sample contain admissible
evidence. In Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., the court found the discovery was
relevant, “however . . . the Court, at this juncture, cannot say the material will be
admissible at trial. Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiffs to pay 50% of the document
production costs.”449
In contrast, in Hagemeyer North America, Inc. v. Gateway Data Sciences Corp.,
the court ordered sampling, which showed approximately ten percent of the email
searched contained keywords, of which an unidentified number were, in fact,
relevant.450 The court held that the “existence of the e-mails on the five backup tapes
is sufficient to establish that further discovery of the backup tapes may lead to the
discovery of relevant evidence.” 451 In other words, finding some potentially relevant
email was enough.
The cases offer a wide spectrum for defining the importance of the discovery, with
both ends creating perverse incentives. Hagemeyer North America, Inc. arguably sets
the bar too low: keyword search can return any number of “hits” without returning any
relevant documents.452 Schweinfurth sets the bar too high: modifying the rules of
discovery to require proof of admissibility. Wiginton and Quinby offer a middle
ground, yet the lines they draw are problematic.
Low prevalence is not necessarily the result of a poorly tailored request, it is often
an inherent characteristic of ESI collections. Practitioners suggest original collections
have a prevalence rate that is usually less than five percent and often less than one
percent.453 Scholars utilize “realistic document collection[s]” that have prevalence
rates ranging from 0.34% to 3.92%, with a mean of 1.175% to study predictive coding

447 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
448 Id. at 109, 111.
449 Schweinfurth v Motorola, Inc., No. 05CV0024, 2008 WL 4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 30, 2008).
450 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 597–98, 603 (E.D.
Wis. 2004).
451 Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., No. 97-CV-00635, at *10 (E.D.
Wis. Dec. 27, 2004), ECF No. 173 (emphasis added).
452 Doug Austin, Sometimes, Your Wildcard May Not Be ‘Wild’ Enough, EDISCOVERY DAILY
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://cloudnine.com/ediscoverydaily/electronic-discovery/sometimeswildcard-may-not-wild-enough-ediscovery-best-practices/ (noting a keyword search intending
to retrieve variations on “mine,” “mines,” and “mining” retrieved over 300,000 files because
there are 269 words in English that begin with “min”).
453 Ralph Losey, Project Cost Estimation Is Key to Opposing ESI Discovery as
Disproportionately Burdensome Under Rule 26(b)(1), L. & TECH. (May 6, 2018), https://ediscoveryteam.com/2018/05/06/project-cost-estimation-is-key-to-opposing-esi-discovery-asdisproportionately-burdensome-under-rule-26b1/.
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algorithms.454 In other words, scholars and practitioners assume the number of
relevant documents will be “quite low when compared to the volume.”455
In analyzing sample results, courts should do the same. If they do so, the courts
have an objective measure of both cost and benefit, as defined by the existence of
relevant documents. The parties need not argue about, and the court need not rule on
“a pig in a poke.”456
3.

Core Discovery

In defining the importance of discovery, there is a second, objective alternative
that incorporates the best practices found in some of the judicial decisions reviewed.
Some courts have expressly recognized the benefits of tiered discovery. The court in
Kleen Products, LLC v. Packaging Corp. of America noted, “[i]n pursuing a
collaborative approach, some lessons have been learned . . . to the extent possible,
discovery phases should be discussed and agreed to at the onset of discovery.”457 The
Sedona Conference’s Commentary on Proportionality advocates conducting
discovery in phases, “starting with discovery of clearly relevant information located
in the most accessible and least expensive sources.”458
Tiered discovery could be used in the cost-shifting analyses as well, not based on
accessibility, but by distinguishing between core discovery and more marginally
relevant discovery. Practitioners have negotiated discovery protocols for adverse
employment and FLSA cases that provide for disclosure of “core discovery” at the
beginning of the case.459 Arbitration bodies such as FINRA have identified core
discovery that the parties are expected to produce, e.g., securities firms are expected

454 Gordon V. Cormack & Maura R. Grossman, Evaluation of Machine-Learning Protocols
for Technology Assisted Review in Electronic Discovery, in SIGIR ‘14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
37TH INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT IN
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 154–55 (2014).
455 Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
456 Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 690 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
457 Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *19
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012), aff’d, 2013 WL 120240 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2013); see also Chen-Oster
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Moore v. Publicis Groupe,
287 F.R.D. 182, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA,
2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL
4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010); Barrera v. Boughton, No. 07cv1436, 2010 WL
3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010).
458 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 157.
459 Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Breaking the Boilerplate Habit in Civil Discovery,
AKRON L. REV. 683, 698 (2018).
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to produce all agreements and all correspondence with the customer.460 The Federal
Circuit has identified “core documentation” in patent litigation.461
In many cases, there are commonly requested documents that support the claims
and defenses in routinely litigated matters. There is “core discovery that reasonable
lawyers know they will have to produce in any event,” and there is value in having it
early in the case.462 An evaluation of “core discovery” in the case provides an objective
basis for analyzing the importance of the discovery in dispute. If it is core discovery
from key players, the traditional presumption should apply.463 If not, this factor should
weigh in favor of cost shifting.
Advance agreement regarding core discovery in a particular field is unnecessary.
Judge Grimm has authored a trans-substantive discovery order that incorporates
phased discovery.464 He suggests:
[T]he logical starting place ought to be the causes of actions and defenses
actually pleaded, the elements of proof that must be met for each, and the
information that the party does not already have from sources other than their
adversary. At a minimum, discovery should be phased to focus first on the
actual evidence needed to prove the pleaded claims and defenses.465
The focus here is on the claims and defenses, rather than accessibility or cost. This
same distinction between core and more marginally relevant discovery could apply to
the cost-shifting analysis.466
Some courts have done just that. In Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., the court
examined whether the disputed discovery went to “the very heart of the litigation,”
and shifted costs after determining it did not.467 In United States ex rel. Bibby v. Wells
460 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Discovery Guide and Document Production
Lists, FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES,
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/ArbMed/p394527.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
461 Fed. Cir. Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, U.S. CT. APP. FOR FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/announcements/model-e-discovery-order-adopted-federalcircuit-advisory-counsel-0 (last visited June 18, 2020).
462 Judicial Roundtable, supra note 75, at 33 (Judge Koeltl’s comments).
463 See Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving
Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 54 (2015)
(“Core discovery will virtually always be proportional.”).
464 See generally Paul W. Grimm, Discovery Order, U.S. DIST. OF MD.,
www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/grimm_discovery_order.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2019); see also Paul W. Grimm, Practical Ways to Achieve Proportionality During Discovery
and Reduce Costs in the Pretrial Phase of Federal Civil Cases, 51 AKRON L. REV. 721, 734–35
(2018).
465 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 518.
466 Id. at 523–24.
467 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *15
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (citing Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322
F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017)).
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Fargo Bank, the court ordered relators to pay fifty percent of the costs of production
for documents originated after a specified date because they were “far less likely to
bear fruit.”468 It declined to shift the costs of production of documents that “constitute
the meat of this lawsuit.”469 In Unknown Parties v. Johnson, the court declined to shift
the costs of preserving a video recording given “the importance of the evidence.”470
In Williams v. Angie’s List, the court declined to order cost shifting for information
“critical” to plaintiff’s claims.471
Similarly, in Solo v. United Parcel Service Co., where plaintiffs sought ten years
of ESI, the court distinguished between time periods for which there were potentially
dispositive contractual defenses and those for which there were not.472 It shifted costs
for the former, but ordered defendant to pay for and produce data from a sample of the
latter.473 In FDIC v. Brudnicki, the court adopted an ESI protocol shifting the cost of
imaging and hosting charges for production requests at the “outer boundaries of
relevant information,” because of its modest expense and the fact that plaintiff was
producing “at no cost . . . the key documents” in the case.474
Scholars have also suggested that the perverse incentives created by straight
application of either the traditional presumption or a requester-pays rule can be
mitigated by “having initial rounds of discovery under the traditional responder pays
cost allocation rules” and then, “at some point the cost allocation rule is reversed and
requester pays.”475 The hard part is identifying that point. Some have suggested a caseby-case application.476 The Sedona Conference draws a line between accessibility and
inaccessibility, encouraging the courts to address cost shifting only after all relevant
reasonably accessible information has been produced and reviewed.477 The Federal
Circuit Model Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases mandates disclosure of

468 United States ex rel. Bibby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1355–56
(N.D. Ga. 2015).
469 Id. at 1356.
470 Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250, 2017 WL 7520603, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec.
19, 2017).
471 Williams v. Angie’s List, Inc., No. 16-CV-00878, 2017 WL 1318419, at *6 (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 10, 2017).
472 Solo v. United Parcel Service Co., No. 14-12719, 2017 WL 85832, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
10, 2017).
473 Id. at *3–4. If plaintiff then sought production of the entirety of the ESI from that period,
plaintiff would have to pay for it. Id.
474 F.D.I.C. v. Brudnicki, 291 F.R.D. 669, 677 (N.D. Fla. 2013).
475 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1496–97.
476 Id. at 1497.
477 Sedona Conference, Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 121, at 41 ¶ 14.3.2.
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core documents and then draws a line: no cost shifting for requests of up to five search
terms directed to up to five custodians, and beyond that cost shifting.478
Yet, case-by-case standards provide little guidance, and an accessible-inaccessible
divide fails to recognize the growing pressure to make information inaccessible. With
increasing cybersecurity risks, there are costs to maintaining information on active
servers. With cost shifting for inaccessible information, there are incentives to
“downgrade information” to “inaccessible forms” in order to avoid discovery or shift
costs.479 At the same time, numerical limits discourage the use of narrowly defined
terms and ignore the reality that the number of key players will vary, as will the
accessible ESI they possess.
A better line creates a presumption against cost shifting if the discovery relates to
a core issue, as defined by the pleaded claims and defenses.480 Doing so acknowledges
the truth-seeking function of discovery,481 and that “[d]ocuments create a paper reality
we call proof.”482 Doing so enables a court to make legal decisions regarding
relevancy, rather than technical decisions regarding accessibility and burden.
Successfully defining “core discovery” will depend on cooperation, in the form of
disclosure. Scholars suggest tailoring discovery is dependent on the judge or
magistrate having sufficient information to evaluate the utility of the discovery.483 The
Sedona Conference likewise urges disclosure and cooperation:
Parties who wish to conduct phased discovery must communicate . . . about
the issues relevant to the litigation and making meaningful disclosures about
the repositories . . . that may contain relevant information. Moreover, the
parties must cooperate with one another to prepare and propose to the court
a phased discovery plan.484
Cooperation and disclosure regarding “core discovery” focuses the discussion. It
focuses the discovery, and, in most cases, it offers an objective basis for defining
importance. The question to ask here is, have the parties disclosed the information
necessary to define core discovery in the case? If so, and if the disputed discovery

478 Fed. Cir. Advisory Council, supra note 461, at 3.
479 Mast, supra note 13 at 1839; Kara A. Schiermeyer, Note, The Artful Dodger: Responding
Parties' Ability to Avoid Electronic Discovery Costs Under 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b(2)(C) and the
Preservation Obligation, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 227, 261 (2009).
480 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 517–18.
481 United Consumers Club, Inc. v. Prime Time Mktg. Mgmt. Inc., No. 07 CV 358, 2009 WL
3200540, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2009) (“Discovery is a search for the truth.”); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Harlem River
Consumers Co-op., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (“The purpose of discovery is to provide an orderly, efficient and effective means for
ascertaining the truth in order to expedite a determination of the controversy on the merits.”).
482 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 214.
483 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1497.
484 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 159.
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seeks information from key players about key facts, this factor should weigh in favor
of the traditional presumption. If not, the courts should consider cost shifting.
F. Defining Burden and Benefit
Courts have struggled to define burden. There are two steps that would enable
courts to move beyond estimates as advocacy and increase objectivity: first, require
multiple estimates for any disputed discovery; and, second, if costs are shifted, share
control of the process or limit cost shifting. The standard for cost shifting, like
preservation, should be reasonableness, not perfection.
1.

Cooperation & Estimates

Courts should require parties to follow common practice in obtaining bids for large
projects—talk to more than one vendor. One court has done so: In Escamilla v. SMS
Holdings Corp., the court held defendant “SMS has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the costs to restore and search the data will create an undue burden
or cost. SMS’s entire argument relies on the cost estimates provided by only one
vendor.”485 The court emphasized the importance of this, noting that defendant
“admits that it has only provided ‘comprehensive estimates from one vendor,’”486 and
the estimates are speculative because defendant relied on “a number of industry
standard assumptions” rather than case-specific variables determined by sampling.487
Compare this to Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, where defendant failed to substantiate its
ballpark estimate of “$50,000 – $100,000” in costs, and the court found
“[n]evertheless, it seems fair to assume that obtaining the requested records . . . will
entail some cost.”488 The court then found it fair to split the costs.489
The common advice given to practitioners is to obtain three estimates before hiring
an eDiscovery vendor to perform work.490 The same advice should apply to cost
shifting. By requiring more than one estimate in cost shifting or proportionality
disputes, courts encourage efficiency. One vendor will have every incentive to inflate
an estimate to satisfy a client looking to argue undue burden. Competing vendors will

485 Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09–2120, 2011 WL 5025254, at *9 (D. Minn. Oct.
21, 2011); see also Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 334 F.R.D. 23, 29
(W.D.N.Y. 2019); Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05–2130,
2007 WL 333987, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2007).
486 Escamilla, 2011 WL 5025254, at *9.
487 Id.
488 Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, No. C07-04330, 2008 WL 4786621, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30,
2008).
489 Id.
490 See, e.g., SEDONA CONFERENCE, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE SELECTION OF ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY VENDORS: NAVIGATING THE VENDOR PROPOSAL PROCESS (2007),
https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/default/files/publications/Navigating%20the%20Vendor
%20Proposal%20Process%20Bet%20Practices%20for%20the%20Selection%20of%20Electro
nic%20Discovery%20Vendors%20June%202007.pdf. See id. at Appendix E for a sample
decision matrix that contemplates scoring and ranking three separate vendors.
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have less incentive to do so if they know that the court will order work done by or
reimbursed at the rate of the low-cost provider.
The incentive to inflate estimates decreases further if courts require and consider
a requesting party’s alternative proposal and estimate.491 Prior to hearing a costshifting motion, courts should mandate disclosure of sufficient information to allow
the requesting party to obtain an estimate for the work to be done. If the requesting
party does not have enough information to obtain an estimate, there has not been
enough cooperation, and the court should deny the motion.
A court requiring at least two estimates from the producing party and one from the
requesting party would alleviate many of the current problems with litigants using
estimates as advocacy. It may be difficult to create apples-to-apples comparisons as
the software and processes used by different vendors differ, but the information
disclosed will ground the discussion in fact and offer the court options.
2.

Shared Expenses & Shared Control

That range of options will inevitably include debates over use of “obsolete
technology” and technology that is “an albatross around the neck of electronic data
discovery.”492 The debate may focus today on forms of production or how to collect
ESI from mobile devices and something else tomorrow. Rule 1 encourages the courts
to focus on efficiency. If it orders cost shifting, courts should do so at rates utilizing
the most cost-effective means available to produce the information.
In thinking about process, litigants make choices regarding who performs the work
and how they do it. In Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, when defendant sought to outsource
the work and shift over $100,000 in costs, the court directed the parties “to consider .
. . using defendant's recently installed software and in-house IT staff and . . . utilizing
Rule 502 to minimize the expense of a detailed privilege review.”493 The court found
defendant’s reliance on its vendor’s estimate “greatly exaggerated.”494 In Adair v. EQT
Production Co. the court again found that in-house technology provided a
“reasonable” means to facilitate review. The responding party had the ability to filter
and keyword search email,495 and though keyword has its limitations, it was
“reasonable under the circumstances.”496
Compare Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., discussed
supra,497 where the amount in controversy was $120,000 and defendant’s estimate

491 See N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. MultiPlan, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 53
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (inviting submission of estimates from both producing and requesting parties).
492 BALL, supra note 337, at 21.
493 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07–1225, 2009 WL 2168892, at *2 (D. Kan. July
21, 2009).
494 Id. at *3.
495 Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880, at *3–5 (W.D. Va. May 31,
2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 2526982 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012).
496 Id.
497 See supra text accompanying notes 321–25.
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from a multi-national eDiscovery vendor was that it would cost $121,000, exclusive
of attorney review time, to produce email from nineteen employees.498 What if, instead
of simply shifting these costs, the court had encouraged the parties to negotiate an
alternative protocol for the three key custodians instead of all nineteen employees?
Two hundred nineteen gigabytes would have been reduced to fifty-five gigabytes, and
$121,183.65 to $32,294.53.499 Producing in native file format would have eliminated
imaging costs and reduced that sum to $17,856.53.500 Purchasing a license for an
eDiscovery tool, as defendant proposed in Semsroth, would have eliminated the data
extraction fees, resulting in costs of less than $10,000 instead of $121,000.501
There is still a cost to the discovery. Somebody has to do the work. Somebody has
to review the documents. But tailored discovery and alternative workflows would have
reduced the cost in the above example to a small fraction of the $121,000 estimated.
The proportionality analysis becomes very different at that point. Is it worth spending
several thousand dollars, exclusive of review time, to determine what three key players
wrote?
Some courts and scholars have proposed another alternative: provide the ESI to
the opposing party to search. As discussed above, Rowe sets out a protocol for the
requesting party to restore and then search the backup tapes in question.502 Other
courts have required production of entire databases to the requesting party, despite
objections that irrelevant information and confidential information may be included.503
Scholars have suggested that assigning the responding party the task of defining
keyword searches and training predictive coding tools creates “misaligned incentives”
because of cross-party agency costs.504 It is the requesting party that has the incentive

498 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Earl Scheib, Inc., No. 11–CV–0788, 2013 WL 485846, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013).
499 Ahmadian Declaration, supra note 322, at 2.
500 Id.
501 Id.
502 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432–33 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); see also In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR (Saxagliptin & Metformin)
Prods. Liab. Litig., No.18-MD-2809, 2020 WL 2739176, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. May 26, 2020);
Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs. Inc., No. 16-CV-00193, 2017 WL 1737723, at *4 (D. Idaho
May 3, 2017); Viet. Veterans of Am. v. CIA, No. 09–CV–0037, 2012 WL 2375490, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 22, 2012); Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Filene’s Basement, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 244, 2009 WL
855955, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009).
503 Compare High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM, 2011 WL 4526770,
at *12 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2011) (requiring production of entire database), and Goshawk
Dedicated Ltd. v. Am. Viatical Servs., LLC, No. 05-CV-2343, 2007 WL 3492762, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Nov. 5, 2007) (same), with Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 305
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (not requiring production of entire database), and Daugherty v. Murphy, No.
06–CV–0878, 2010 WL 4877720, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 23, 2010) (same), and Nicholas J.
Murlas Living Tr. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 93 C 6956, 1995 WL 124186, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
20, 1995) (same).
504 Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 1504.
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to optimally invest in searching the ESI, and advanced search technologies can
mitigate the asymmetric information problems that otherwise exist when a requesting
party is searching a data set.505
While concerns about privilege make turning over ESI to the requesting party
unrealistic in many cases,506 doing some of the work in-house is not. Ninety-five
percent of Fortune 1000 companies, along with over two billion smaller organizations,
now use cloud-based productivity solutions with basic eDiscovery functionality.507
There are also an increasing number of options for outsourcing work to vendors
offering simplified workflows, including technology assisted review.508 The point is
that litigants have choices. The question is, do they have the incentives to choose a
“reasonable,” cost-effective option?
Cases report “overblown” cost-shifting arguments estimating forty hours to extract
the requested information and six times that for quality assurance.509 Litigants estimate
costs based on a “page-by-page” review of 1.2 million electronic documents, without
use of any search terms or “automated screening” technology.510 Or, they assume the
need to decrypt an entire database and $3.125 million in costs to manually review each
transaction, instead of using commercially available software to identify relevant
files.511 Litigants then estimate review costs based on hourly rates charged by senior
associates charging $410 an hour.512 Experts write about vendors projecting over
$25,000 in costs for processing ordinary business data, work done in twelve hours of

505 Id. at 1506.
506 Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 3288058, at *20
(D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (sampling showed 95% of the corpus was expected to be nonresponsive and contain privileged and work-product communications, proprietary information
unrelated to the case, and confidential third-party and customer information); Mast, supra note
13, at 1830.
507 See Michael Brown, Why Moving to the Cloud is a Legal Conversation, LIGHTHOUSE
(July 23, 2019), https://blog.lighthouseglobal.com/why-moving-to-the-cloud-is-a-legalconversation; Mark Johnson et al., eDiscovery in Office 365, MICROSOFT,
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/ediscovery?view=o365worldwide#ediscoverycases (last updated Jan. 12, 2021); Liam Tung, Google: G Suite Now Has
2 Billion Users, ZDNET (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-g-suite-nowhas-2-billion-users/.
508 Rob Robinson, An eDiscovery Challenge: Pricing Consistency and Transparency,
COMPLEXDISCOVERY (May 16, 2017), https://complexdiscovery.com/an-ediscovery-challengepricing-consistency-and-transparency/.
509 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
510 Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 14-03053,
2018 WL 5816108, at *4 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018).
511 Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 18-CV-01359, 2020 WL
1689708, at *3–4 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020).
512 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc. 254 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2008) (splitting the
cost of privilege review costs of up to $4,000 based on the cost of paralegal review).
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largely unattended machine time, and over $125,000 in costs to process data into a
review tool, again work that could be done in a day and largely by a machine.513 Panels
of experts have suggested that about seventy percent of the money spent on
eDiscovery is wasted.514
Even in cases with an engaged judge, well-versed in eDiscovery, the costs can be
“overblown”. When the court in Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. shifted more than
$750,000 in eDiscovery costs, industry analysts compared the costs with industry
pricing surveys, and asked, were costs “shifted” or was the requesting party
“shafted”?515 In Lawson, the court shifted processing costs that were over three times
the reported industry average.516 It shifted attorney per document review costs that
were almost three times the reported industry average.517 It shifted per gigabyte
predictive coding/technology assisted review costs that were at least 2.8 times the
reported industry average,518 and hosting costs double the reported industry average.519
What is lacking are the incentives to find the most cost-effective solution. The
responding party, presumed best situated to determine how to preserve and produce
its information, confronts perverse incentives where finding the most cost-effective
solution decreases the likelihood of prevailing in a proportionality motion seeking to
preclude the discovery or, in the alternative, shift its costs. In cases where the courts
shift costs after the fact, the parties are left to argue about the legally defined

513 Craig Ball, Unconscionable, BALL IN YOUR COURT,
https://ballinyourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/unconscionable/.

(June

19,

514 See Craig Ball, Ten Things That Trouble Judges About E-Discovery, BALL
COURT (Aug. 9, 2013), https://craigball.net/2013/08/09/1370/.

2014),
IN

YOUR

515 Greg Buckles, Nuggets of Gold from a TAR Fight – Pt 2, EDISCOVERY JOURNAL,
https://ediscoveryjournal.com/nuggets-of-gold-from-a-tar-fight-pt-2/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)
(citing Rob Robinson, Balancing Relevance and Reality? Winter 2021 eDiscovery Pricing
Survey Results, COMPLEX DISCOVERY, https://complexdiscovery.com/balancing-relevance-andreality-winter-2021-ediscovery-pricing-survey-results/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)); Doug
Austin, Shifted or Shafted? Greg Buckles Applies Rob Robinson’s Pricing Survey Results to the
Lawson Case, EDISCOVERYTODAY, https://ediscoverytoday.com/2020/12/10/shifted-orshafted-greg-buckles-applies-rob-robinsons-pricing-survey-results-to-the-lawson-caseediscovery-trends/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
516 Buckles, supra note 515. Most survey respondents (53.2%) identified their per GB
processing costs as falling in the range of $25-75, compared to $182 paid by Aerospirit and then
shifted to Lawson. Id.
517 Id. Most survey respondents (48.1%) identified their attorney cost per document as falling
in the range of $.50 - $1.00, compared to $2.24 per document paid by Aerospirit and then shifted
to Lawson. Id.
518 Id. Most survey respondents (53.2%) identified their predictive coding/technology
assisted review costs were “less than $75” per gigabyte, compared to the $214 per gigabyte
price paid by Aerospirit and then shifted to Lawson.
519 Id. Most survey respondents (54.4%) identified their monthly hosting costs as falling
within a range of $10-20, compared to the $30 paid by Aerospirit and then shifted to Lawson.
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“reasonableness” of the choice made,520 but “[t]here is a big difference between
reasonable and competitive.”521
At the same time, if courts approve of oversized cost estimates and then shift all
or a portion of those costs, responding parties have little incentive to invest in
technology to efficiently preserve and produce ESI. Deciding whether to perform
some eDiscovery-related functions in-house depends, in part, on the investment the
responding party makes in advance of the litigation. Entities that have chosen to
upgrade to modern backup technology can search backup media with little to no extra
cost over searching active servers. Entities that have chosen to upgrade to modern
document management systems are able to preserve, collect, and complete basic
search-related tasks, without engaging an outside vendor.
All of which makes part of Judge Facciola’s analysis in McPeek less compelling.
In McPeek, he wrote that a parties’ “choice” to use computers “assumes an alternative”
and “[w]hat alternative is there? Quill pens?”522 Framed as a binary choice, to use
computers or not, there is little alternative. But the choices are more complicated.
Courts have long acknowledged that parties make choices about how to store
information, and those parties are responsible for their choices.523 Courts do not
hesitate to shift costs as a sanction when one party fails to comply with discovery
obligations.524 Courts do not hesitate to shift costs when the responding party breaches
a duty to preserve, requiring costly steps to restore or recover relevant information.525

520 “To determine the amount of expenses to allocate to Lawson, the court must
independently analyze the reasonableness of Spirit's expenses.” Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems,
Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 6343292, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2020), aff'd, No. 181100-EFM, 2020 WL 6939752 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 2020).
521 Id.
522 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001).
523 See, e.g., Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 330–32 (M.D. Ala. 1991);
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal
Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 724 (2003); R. Thomas
Howell, Jr. & Rae N. Coger, Developing and Implementing A Record Retention Program, 50
PRAC. L. 21, 28–29 (2004).
524 See, e.g., Youngevity Int’l Corp. v. Smith, No. 16-cv-00704, 2017 WL 6541106, at *12
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017); Est. of Shaw v. Marcus, No. 14 Civ. 3849, 2017 WL 825317, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017); Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures, Corp., No. CV 05–
1516, 2007 WL 2758571, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007).
525 See, e.g., Coyne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., LLC, No. CIV 15-0054, 2016 WL 9488766,
at *2–3 (D.N.M. Dec. 16, 2016); Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles, Inc., No.
12cv2472, 2014 WL 12642170, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Stewart v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
2014 WL 12600282, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2014); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[I]f a party creates its own burden or expense by converting into an
inaccessible format data that it should have reasonably foreseen would be discoverable material
at a time when it should have anticipated litigation, then it should not be entitled to shift the
costs of restoring and searching the data.”).
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The same issues arise with the choices parties make regarding document retention
policies.526 In Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Medical Center, LLC, defendant implemented
a three-day auto-delete policy and then argued its ESI was inaccessible and the
opposing party’s discovery not proportional. The court rejected the argument, citing
case law holding that “the Court cannot relieve Defendant of its duty to produce those
documents merely because Defendant has chosen a means to preserve the evidence
which makes ultimate production of relevant documents expensive.”527 Courts have
drawn the same distinction in ruling on cost-shifting motions. In DeGeer v. Gillis, the
court split the cost of producing some information, but refused to do so where a party
had adopted a policy of immediately deleting emails to avoid production during
discovery.528
Judges have warned that “[t]he proliferation of electronically stored information
and the resulting increasing reliance on retention policies make the concept of ‘willful
blindness’ all the more acute.”529 Courts must ensure that companies cannot “blindly
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document
retention policy.”530
While the current rules encourage parties to make their information inaccessible
as quickly as possible, making the process more expensive and cost-shifting
arguments more persuasive,531 investment in a “well-organized document
management system will ultimately reduce litigation expenses through more efficient
document retrieval during discovery requests.”532
Courts considering cost shifting should consider the incentives they create. What
this Article proposes, is that courts require and consider alternative processes, and if
costs are shifted, shift the incentives. If costs are shifted, allow the requesting party to
seek out and engage a lower cost provider or reimburse the responding party at a
competitive rate, assuming sound information governance and cost-effective

526 See, e.g., In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 2009) (noting that a
thirty-day document retention policy for email resulted in only one responsive email); Connor
v. Sun Tr. Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366–68, 1375–77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (observing that a
thirty-day document retention policy for email resulted in deletion of relevant email and
spoliation claim).
527 Wagoner v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 7:15CV570, 2016 WL 3893135, at *3 (W.D.
Va. July 14, 2016) (internal quotations omitted); see also Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs.,
Inc., No. 08-CV-900, 2009 WL 4730798, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009) (internal quotations
omitted).
528 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
529 Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 37 (Tex. 2014) (Guzman, J., dissenting).
530 Id.
531 Schiermeyer, supra note 479, at 227–28; Mast, supra note 13, at 1839; Groot, supra note
438, at 2.
532 Jessica Lynn Repa, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the
Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 257, 297 (2004).
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eDiscovery practices. If a responding party chooses a preferred process or vendor in
lieu of a more cost-efficient one, it should bear the added expense.
Absent that, the current legal standard will continue to reward those who create
undue burden: those who do not invest in technology that enables the efficient
production of information, and those who hire the highest price vendor. There are
choices to be in made in responding to requests for ESI, and the courts’ decisions
regarding cost shifting influence those choices.
3.

Costs of Review & Other Costs

Nowhere are those choices more evident than with the cost of review. Most of the
surveyed decisions that consider whether to shift the cost of review shift the cost of
restoration and or search, but not the cost of review.533 In Zubulake, the court
emphasized that the parties could reach an agreement “and thereby avoid any cost of
reviewing . . . for privilege.”534 Rowe reached the same conclusion: “the sanctity of
defendants’ documents can be adequately preserved at little cost by enforcement of a
confidentiality agreement and . . . a protocol” that contained claw-back and nonwaiver provisions.535

533 See., e.g., OptoLum Inc v. Cree Inc., No. 1:17CV687, 2018 WL 6834608, at *9
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2018); Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc,
No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *7 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018); EQT Prod. Co. v. Terra
Servs., LLC, No. 14-1053, 2017 WL 10457417, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2017); Estate of Shaw
v. Marcus, No. 14 Civ. 3849, 14 Civ. 5653, 2017 WL 825317, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017);
Elkarwily v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. 3:15-cv-05579-RJB, 2016 WL 4061575, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. July 29, 2016); United States ex rel. Guardiola v. Renown Health, No. 3:12-cv-00295,
2015 WL 5056726, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2015); Hausman v. Holland America Line-USA,
No. 13cv00937, 2015 WL 11234152, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2015); United States ex rel.
Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 12-CV-881, 2014 WL 12787823, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2014);
Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No. 12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014);
Thornton v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *2–3
(N.D. Okla. May 3, 2013); Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 1:11-cv-00991, 2013 WL
1310216, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00037, 2012 WL
1965880, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2012); Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ.
8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *4 (Dec. 27, 2012); Couch v. Wan, No. CV08–1621, 2011 WL
2551546, at *4 (June 24, 2011); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789,
2011 WL 1897213, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the
Christian Bros. of N.M., No. CIV 09-0885, 2010 WL 4928866, at *5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010);
Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., No. 07-1078, 2010 WL 1381225, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 2010); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill.
June 3, 2002); Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388, 2008 WL
3822773, at *7, *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630,
638–41 (D. Kan. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill.
2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Murphy
Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *5–8 (E.D. La.
Feb. 19, 2002); Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462–63 (D. Utah 1985).
534 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290–91 (emphasis added).
535 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
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The costs are significant. The 2012 RAND study Where the Money Goes found
attorney review for relevance, responsiveness, and privilege accounted for seventythree percent of the total cost of the discovery.536 Empirical studies suggest that
discovery costs account for between twenty and fifty percent of total litigation costs.537
Impressionistic studies suggest that discovery costs in cases that do not go to trial are
closer to seventy percent of total costs. If less than one percent of all federal cases now
go to trial,538 seventy percent of the costs of those cases are attributable to discovery,
and seventy-three percent of those costs are generated by attorney review, then shifting
review costs to the opposing party potentially shifts the majority of litigation costs.
Since 1796, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the American Rule, so that
those with limited resources “should not be unjustly discouraged from vindicating
their rights.”539 Shifting the costs of review does just that. It penalizes those who
cannot pay, and it undermines Supreme Court jurisprudence, not by congressionally
enacted statute, but by interlocutory discovery order. Yet, the cost of review is
logically part of the burden of discovery. At the end of the day, somebody must pay
for it. Framed as a binary choice between who should bear that burden, the issue
presents harsh choices. The question to ask first is, is there a better way?
The Sedona Conference’s Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI
acknowledges that “the procedure and process for protecting privileged ESI from
production is broken,” and preparation of a privilege log alone can consume hundreds
of thousands of dollars.540 The solution is not to shift the costs of a broken system onto
the requesting party; the solution is to re-evaluate the methodology.
In the context of cost shifting, this means evaluating different methods of review
when assessing the burden, and, if courts ultimately choose to shift costs then
determining how much to shift. If a party seeks to shift costs, it should not dictate the
costs by controlling the methodology. Instead, the courts should limit the costs shifted
to those associated with the least expensive means of review aided by technology and
a Rule 502(d) order.
Some courts have already done this. Judge Francis’s protocol in Rowe allowed the
requesting party to designate an expert to restore the backup tape in question and
offered the responding party a choice: produce that tape to the requesting party without

536 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at xiv–xv.
537 Emergy G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L. J. 765, 781 (2010).
538 Id.
539 Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (“[S]ince
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit . . . the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”).
540 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, 17 SEDONA CONF. J.
95, 103, 155 (2016).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/7

76

2021]

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF COST SHIFTING

425

review, subject to a claw-back agreement, or review at its own expense the restored
email communications.541 Other courts have adopted similar protocols.542
Still, others have explored options between linear review and no review.543 The
Sedona Conference discusses the use of “general and matter- or entity-specific
privilege ontology searches” and the use of email addresses and domain names to
identify counsel.544 Email threading and concept engines can also be used to identify
privileged documents.545 The court in Good v. American Water Works Co. encouraged
the use of technology assisted review for privilege in lieu of the manual review,546 and
there is now machine learning-based “attorney-client privilege detection” built into
widely used productivity software.547 Elsewhere, practitioners have proposed
streamlined privileged log protocols utilizing automated metadata logs and
sampling.548 In short, the producing party has choices when it comes to review.549
Traditionally, the producing party “unilaterally decides on the review protocol,”550
and some have objected to attempts to encourage use of technology assisted review
that forgoes linear review. They argue that this infringes on attorney-client privilege
and work product protections.551 The concern is “that electronic searching is not
adequate to protect its rights.”552
541 See Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432–33 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
542 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at
*8–9 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002); see also Remy Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.P.A., No. 1:11–CV–00991,
2013 WL 1310216, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2013); Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the
Christian Bros. of New Mexico, 2010 WL 4928866, at *4–5 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010).
543 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574–77 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
544 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 169.
545 Id. at 170.
546 Good v. Am. Water Works Co., No. 2:14-01374, 2014 WL 5486827, at *2–3 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 29, 2014).
547 Set up attorney-client privilege detection in Advanced eDiscovery, MICROSOFT,
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/attorney-privilegedetection?view=o365-worldwide (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
548 EDRM Streamlined Privilege Log Protocol, EDRM, https://edrm.net/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/EDRM_Privilege-Log-Protocol_Draft-as-of-11_30_20.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
549 See, e.g., Sun Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No.1:18-cv-01359, slip op.
at 6–7 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020); Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp.,
Inc, No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 25, 2018).
550 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
551 Almont, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5; Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos. 1:10CV00037,
1:10CV00041, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012).
552 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–5.
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Yet, courts have long recognized manual review is no longer realistic, and perfect
review is impossible. Fifteen years ago, Judge Grimm acknowledged “the unavoidable
truth” that discovery may encompass millions of electronic records that are
discoverable and “to insist in every case upon ‘old world’ record-by-record preproduction privilege review . . . would impose upon parties costs of production that
bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation.”553 As a result, the rules
now “encourage” the requesting party to agree not to assert waiver where a responding
party agrees to produce ESI without doing “a full-fledged privilege review.”554
Some courts now find cost shifting unnecessary “because those costs could be
mitigated by the use of electronic searching and production, together with the
protections of the Protective and Clawback Orders.”555 Other courts decline to shift
the costs of review because of the protections now afforded by Fed. R. Evid. 502:
while defendant “is, of course, free to engage in as exacting a privilege review as it
wishes, entry of a Rule 502(d) order will protect against waiver if it opts to conduct a
more economical analysis.”556
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 502 make the same points: analytics
facilitate review,557 and 502(d) “enable[s] a court to enter an order . . . that will allow
the parties to conduct and respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for
exhaustive pre-production privilege reviews, while still preserving each party’s right
to assert the privilege.”558
Courts acknowledge this means “errors will be made and privileged documents
will sometimes be produced inadvertently.”559 Yet, the risk of such inadvertent
production is present regardless of “whether the documents are searched and reviewed
electronically or by human eyes.”560
Litigants may reasonably choose to lay eyes on each document prior to production.
The added cost may be worth it. However, given Rule 502(d) and the technology
available to reduce costs, the cost of a traditional review—the cost of a “broken”
system—is not reasonably imposed on the requesting party in a cost-shifting

553 Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005).
554 Id. at 234–35.
555 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3–5.
556 Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 8405, 2012 WL 6732905, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 2012); see also Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., LLC,
No. CV 14-03053, 2018 WL 5816108, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018); Thornton v. Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 12-CV-298, 2013 WL 1890706, at *2–3 (N.D. Okla. May 3,
2013).
557 FED. R. EVID. 502, advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.
558 FED. R. EVID. 502, add. to advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment, quoted in
Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *5.
559 MVB Mortg. Corp. v. F.D.I.C., No. 2:08-CV-771, 2010 WL 582641, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 11, 2010); accord Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d
371, 388 (7th Cir. 2008).
560 Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *4.
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motion.561 For those courts that shift the cost of review, an inquiry into the most
efficient means, with the understanding that Rule 502(d) is designed to obviate the
need for exhaustive review, should be part-in-parcel of any analysis.
Note the incentives this creates. Computers are good at finding key words like
“work product,” and “attorney-client.” They are good at using metadata to create
communication maps and pattern recognition to create subject matter clusters and
rankings. If those maintaining large stores of information know in advance that their
ability to assert privilege or protection over material depends on use of technology
assisted review and that such review is bolstered by properly labeling the material in
the first place, they are more likely to do so.562
Failure to label work product as work product and confidential attorney
communications as confidential communications creates expense. It is a variation on
the same failure to organize that courts have for decades held lies with the party who
created the expense. In Rowe, the court found “defendants retained privileged or
confidential documents in electronic form but failed to designate them to specific
files,” and this was “analogous to where a company intermingles confidential
documents with non-confidential, discoverable papers.” 563 Rowe found “the expense
of sorting such documents is properly borne by the responding party.”564 Courts “will
not shift the burden of discovery onto the discovering party where the costliness of the
discovery procedure involved is entirely a product of the defendant’s record-keeping
scheme over which the plaintiff has no control.”565 A legal norm that suggests “if you

561 Litigants have testified that total privilege review costs exceeding $7 million could have
been avoided using Rule 502 and technology to cull out and prioritize privilege review. See
Committee on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Advisory
27–28
(May
15,
2007),
Committee
on
Evidence
Rules,
U.S. CTS.
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/2007-05-Committee_ReportEvidence.pdf (summarizing joint testimony of Patrick Oot & Anne Kershaw), quoted in Sedona
Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 541, at 102 n.1.
562 Work product, by definition, is limited to documents and tangible things “prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial” by or for a party or its representative. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3)(A). If the party or its representative “anticipates” litigation, there is an opportunity to
label work product accordingly. Assertion of attorney-client privilege generally requires a
confidential communication made to get or give legal advice between an attorney and a client.
See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991). Again, this standard presupposes
intentional action, again offering an opportunity to label the communications as confidential.
What precludes parties from better organizing privileged or protected information in the first
place?
563 Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
564 Id.; see also Davis v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 1737723, at *4 (D. Idaho
May 3, 2017).
565 Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see
also Sun Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01359, 2020 WL 1689708,
at *6 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 7, 2020) (“[T]he fact that there are numerous files, or Defendant has stored
them in an unorganized fashion, does not excuse their production.”); Kozlowski v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D. Mass. 1976).
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want protect a privileged document, label it properly” would save untold sums over
the long term.
Litigation costs will decrease, and so will profits, for some. While litigants use
estimates as advocacy, reports suggest law firms use discovery as a profit center. In
one survey, ninety-three percent of the firms surveyed reported revenue from
eDiscovery “exceeded expectations.”566 Some law firms have marked up contract
attorney review rates 513 percent.567 Some law firms have sought $550 - $1,000 per
hour for contract attorneys doing review work paid at $40-$60 per hour.568
Commentators worry about “stratospheric” mark-ups taking “advantage of the client
by taking a low-priced resource and billing them as a high-priced resource.”569
Attorneys have defended the markup as necessary to cover overhead costs.570 But
should profit margins and overhead costs be shifted to an opposing party or used to
preclude otherwise relevant discovery?
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI
acknowledges that the parties should make use of processes and technologies to reduce
the cost associated with the assertion of privilege.571 Courts can, through the legal
standards they adopt, provide incentives to do so. Refusal to shift the cost of review
will, over the long run create incentives for better document management and more
efficient review.
G. Relative Ability of Each Party to Control Costs
There is little dispute that the specificity of the request defines its costs. The real
question is, how do you get to narrowly tailored discovery? In short, it is an iterative
process, and it requires cooperation.
The party asserting undue burden has the burden to support its motion with
affidavits and evidentiary proof, or at least “detailed explanations.”572 The requesting
566 HBR Releases Results of Law Firm e-Discovery Strategy Survey, BUSINESSWIRE (May
27, 2015), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150527006283/en/HBR-ReleasesResults-Law-Firm-e-Discovery-Strategy.
567 Doug Austin, This Firm Marked Up Reviewer Billings over 500 Percent and that’s Not
the Worst Part, EDISCOVERYDAILY (June 3, 2015), https://www.edrm.net/2015/06/this-firmmarked-up-reviewer-billings-over-500-percent-and-thats-not-the-worst-part-ediscoverytrends/.
568 Martha Neil, Does Legal Fees Motion in $590M Citigroup Case Include $1K Per Hour
J.
(Jan.
3,
2013),
for
Low-Paid
Contract
Lawyers?,
A.B.A.
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/does_legal_fees_motion_in_590m_citigroup_case_i
nclude_1k_per_hour_for_low-p.
569 Gina Passarella, Are Contract Attorney Markups of Any Concern to Clients?, LEGAL
(June 2, 2015), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/6f80d68f-c152-4f40-89ecd15c2a37fd26/?context=1530671.

INTELLIGENCER

570 Austin, supra note 567.
571 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 154
(Principle 4).
572 Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388, 2008 WL 3822773,
at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 633 (D. Kan.
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party has the burden to rebut that showing.573 Yet, the case law shows, time and again,
that litigants fail to provide even basic information about burden, and they fail to
cooperate to narrowly tailor the discovery in dispute. The solution proposed here is to
require both: as a pre-requisite to motion practice, require cooperation in the form of
disclosure of sufficient information to narrowly tailor discovery and obtain an
independent estimate of the costs.
The case law shows responding parties failing to provide “any evidence showing
the expenditure of time, effort or money that would be necessary to produce the
requested documents.”574 Courts find, “frankly, the parties’ broad claims about their
respective discovery proposals are too speculative . . . this is less a situation where the
scales are evenly balanced, and more one where the court has been given nothing to
place on either side.”575 Courts lament “ipse dixit assertions by counsel that requested
discovery of electronic records is overbroad, burdensome or prohibitively expensive
[that] provide no help at all to the court.”576
Litigants will pointedly refuse to provide information about the operating systems
in question, the number of drives, the size of each, and the database management
software. 577 They refuse to list employees or key players. 578 They refuse to identify

2006); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wiginton v. CB Richard
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
573 See United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 243 (S.D.
Cal. 2015).
574 Foreclosure Mgmt. Co., 2008 WL 3822773, at *7; see also Hoist Fitness Sys., Inc. v.
TuffStuff Fitness Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1388, 2019 WL 121195, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7,
2019); Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Pulse Sys., Inc., No. 14-1305, 2017 WL 396286, at *7 (D. Kan.
Jan. 30, 2017); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Healthcare Chiropractic Clinic, Inc., No. 15-cv2527, 2016 WL 9330708, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2016); Nogle v. Beech St. Corp., No. 2:10cv-01092, 2012 WL 3687570, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2012); Dahl v. Bain Cap. Partners, LLC.,
655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass 2009).
575 W Holding Co. v. Chartis Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 293 F.R.D. 68, 74 (D.P.R. 2013).
576 In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc., ERISA Litig., 290 F.R.D. 471, 475 n.5 (D. Md. 2013)
(citations omitted); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98–99 (D.
Md. 2003); see also Nehad v. Browder, No. 15-CV-1386, 2016 WL 3769807, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
July 15, 2016); Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. at 243; Cochran v. Caldera Med., Inc., No.
12-5109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014); Stewart v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No.
12-00532, 2014 WL 12600282, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2014); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n v.
GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 939 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Mikron
Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C07-532RSL, 2008 WL 1805727, at *1–2
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008); S. Cap. Enters., Inc. v. Conseco Servs., LLC, No. 04-0402, 2005
WL 8155415, at *3 (M.D. La. Oct. 6, 2005).
577 Willett v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-1241, 2015 WL 13662593 (D.N.M.
May 8, 2015).
578 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929–30 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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the search terms to be used.579 Litigants refuse to define what is inaccessible, or how
they arrive at their cost estimates.580 In other cases, litigants refuse to answer questions
regarding the content of the hard drives in question, provide access to any of them,
explain whether any of the data might be derived from other sources, or discuss the
costs of alternatives.581 Litigants will argue undue burden, but “keep[] its computer
systems secret.”582 Litigants will seek to shift the cost of converting documents to
searchable form, without identifying the number of documents or custodians; they will
“fail[] to provide any support whatsoever” for their estimate.583 Litigants look for the
court to “rubberstamp” assertions of burden.584
Some courts are critical of this failure to cooperate. They find the responding party
“should have been up-front . . . regarding its proposed custodians and search terms
and then receptive to defense counsel’s input. . . . The requesting party should not have
had to file a motion to compel to obtain disclosure of this information.”585 They expect
the parties to work together to arrive at reasonable search terms and cooperate to refine
them.586 Some courts acknowledge that the “most important ingredient for the
analytical process to produce a fair result is a particularization of the facts to support
any challenge to discovery of electronic records.”587
Some courts reject cost shifting and undue burden arguments because of a failure
to cooperate. Judge Grimm’s standing order makes clear that a parties’ lack of
cooperation will be held against them.588 In Pippins v. KPMG LLP, Judge Francis
found defendant’s refusal to “engage in good faith negotiations over the scope of the
preservation” unreasonable and defendant “hoist on its own petard.”589
579 Id.; Burd v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-CV-20976, 2015 WL 4137915, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
July 8, 2015).
580 Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 11-CV-842, 2016 WL 1128494, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016).
581 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
582 Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 642 (W.D. Mo. 2016) (refusing
to shift cost based on responding party’s refusal to provide information regarding its databases),
order vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 872 F.3d 567, 577
(8th Cir. 2017).
583 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 9:08-CV-143, 2009 WL 440543,
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2009).
584 Hallmark, 2016 WL 1128494, at *3. See generally Cargill Meat Sols. Corp. v. Premium
Beef Feeders, LLC, No. 13-CV-1168, 2015 WL 3937410 (D. Kan. June 26, 2015).
585 DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929–30 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
586 UnitedHealthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs., No. 16-cv-81180, 2017 WL
4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017).
587 Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003).
588 Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 464, at 2.
589 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Pyle v.
Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:16-cv-335, 2016 WL 5661749, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2016)
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In some cases, there is an iterative process where disclosure is followed by more
narrowly tailored discovery during litigants’ motion practice. The discovery that gave
rise to the seminal Zubulake opinions did not start narrowly tailored. Plaintiff’s first
request sought production of “[a]ll documents concerning any communication by or
between UBS employees concerning Plaintiff.”590 Defendant’s objections gave rise to
a motion to compel, an exchange of letters with the court, and a telephone conference
before a magistrate judge.591 Following that telephone conference, defendant agreed
to produce email from the accounts of five individuals named by plaintiff over a
twenty-nine month period.592 Judge Scheindlin went on to find, as revised, “[t]his is a
relatively limited and targeted request.”593
Compare this to plaintiff’s request in Rodriguez-Torres v. Government
Development Bank of Puerto Rico, an employment discrimination case seeking “all email communications and calendar entries describing, relating or referring to plaintiff”
for a three-year period.594 In Rodriguez-Torres, the record shows no hearing and
exchange of information enabling the parties to limit the request to key custodians.
The court simply found the discovery presented “too high” a cost and was “a fishing
expedition.”595 The very same discovery resulted in one case in production of relevant
email from key custodians and in another no production at all. The difference was that
one court required cooperation, which allowed the parties to agree on key custodians.
The second court simply found the discovery overly broad.
The solution proposed here is to mandate cooperation before the motions get filed.
Courts should require disclosure of information sufficient to narrowly tailor the
discovery in question and allow the requesting party or the court to obtain an
independent estimate of the cost of that more narrowly tailored discovery. Courts
should require joint submissions, as part of a Rule 26(c) or 37(a) certification, and in
them require the parties disclose information regarding information systems, key

(internal quotations omitted) (“Among the items about which the court expects counsel to ‘reach
practical agreement’ without the court having to micro-manage e-discovery are ‘search terms,
date ranges, key players and the like.’”); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D.
Pa. 2010); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 94 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding that the meet
and confer process was “compromised by [a] willful failure to identify to the Plaintiffs the full
range of documents that were responsive to Plaintiffs' document requests.”).
590 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also Schachter v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:18 CV 953, 2020 WL 486880,
at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2020); Webasto Thermo & Comfort N. Am. v. BesTop, Inc., 326 F.R.D.
465, 469 (E.D. Mich. 2018); Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Pulse Sys., Inc., No. 14-1305, 2017 WL
396286, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 2017); Hawa v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 15-4828, 2017
WL 1021026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2017).
591 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312–13.
592 Id.
593 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
594 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R. 2010).
595 Id. at 43–44.
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custodians, key sources of ESI, key terminology, and date ranges in order to
specifically tailor the discovery.596
Any evaluation of burden, including the “extent to which the request is specifically
tailored to discover relevant information,” should be preceded by an evaluation of the
extent to which the parties have cooperated. If the responding party has not disclosed
information necessary to specifically tailor the discovery, that fact should weigh
against cost shifting. If there is a meaningful exchange of information, then a
requesting party’s refusal to cooperate in tailoring the discovery to that information
should weigh the analysis in favor of cost shifting.597
Litigants can propound discovery and depose their way to understanding who the
key players are, where the key sources of data are, how it is stored and the like. Or the
courts can create incentives for early case assessment and an iterative process of
disclosure leading to narrowly tailored requests, by conditioning cost-shifting analyses
upon it. The question to ask here is, has there been meaningful cooperation, i.e., a
meaningful exchange of information to enable a narrowly tailored request?
H. The Factors from A to G
At the end of the day, all of these factors boil down to a cost-benefit analysis. Is
the discovery worth it? The answer remains elusive. How courts answer the question
varies dramatically, though the analysis is now often skewed in favor of cost shifting.
Moreover, there is little indication that these factors address all that needs to be
addressed. What if the requesting party offers to pay all or a portion of the costs?
Some courts consider this a factor favoring permitting the discovery; others do not.598

596 See Seventh Circuit Council on eDiscovery and Digital Information, Model Discovery
Plan, EDISCOVERYCOUNCIL.COM 6–7, https://www.ediscoverycouncil.com/content/modeldiscovery-plan-and-privilege-order (last visited June 19, 2020) (proposing disclosure of this
type of information as part of the Rule 26(f) meet and confer).
597 See, e.g., Lawson v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 18-1100-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL
3288058, at *21 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020) (shifting costs after warning the requesting party three
times to cooperate in narrowly tailoring discovery requests); Surplus Source Grp., LLC v. MidAm. Engine, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-049, 2009 WL 961207 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2009) (shifting costs
of repeated search to requesting party given failure to timely communicate regarding search
terms).
598 Compare Estate of Boles v. Nat'l Heritage Realty, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-99, 2010 WL
2038611, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 20, 2010), aff’d, 2010 WL 3087472 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2010),
and Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 3, 1995), and Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257,
1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007), with Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci.
Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A 01CV10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (“There
is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a heightened
level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it. There are limits on the number of
depositions and interrogatories even though more might well produce relevant information.
There is no exception to those limitations based upon one party's willingness to pay. The sense
of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be enhanced by the courts participating
in giving strategic advantage to those with deeper pockets.”), and 2006 Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“A requesting party's willingness to share or bear the access costs
may be weighed by the court in determining whether there is good cause.”).
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What if a party seeks to shift costs after the fact, after the discovery is complete? Some
courts permit this; some do not.599 If cost shifting is warranted, how much of the costs
should be shifted? Courts struggle to articulate more than a suggestion that twentyfive, fifty, or seventy-five percent seems fair.600
What can be said here, with regard to the factors the courts do examine, is that cost
shifting should be predicated on cooperation. Judge Grimm does this in his discovery
orders: “the parties and counsel are expected to work cooperatively during all aspects
of discovery. . . . The failure of a party or counsel to cooperate will be relevant in
resolving any discovery disputes [and] who shall bear the cost of that discovery.”601
And there are courts that have followed suit.602
The proposal here is to go further. Courts should require cooperation before
considering a motion to shift the costs of or say no to otherwise relevant discovery.
The cooperation required by the courts should include disclosure by both parties of
the information necessary for the parties to narrowly tailor the discovery and
accurately estimate its costs and benefits. Only after the parties have exchanged this
information, should the court consider the motion.
When it does hear the motion, courts should require from the parties objectively
verifiable information for each factor. If cost shifting is warranted, courts should share
control over the process or limit shifting of costs to those associated with efficient
information governance, review, and production.
The responding party has choices, and not all choices are created equal. Analyzing
these choices may tax a court with a crowded docket and limited resources, but it can
be managed through a joint submission process. As with a joint case management plan,
it forces the parties to talk, and, if the template is sound, exchange specific information
that bears directly on the costs of the discovery and means to reduce it.

599 Compare Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239 (E.D.
Mich. 2008), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Chiropractic Clinic, No. 15-cv2527, 2016 WL 9330708, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2016), and Am. Water Heater Co. v. Taylor
Winfield Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00125, 2017 WL 7732713, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017),
objections overruled sub nom. Am. Water Heater Co. v. Taylor-Winfield Techs., Inc., No. 2:16CV-125, 2018 WL 3339189 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2018).
600 See, e.g., First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, No. 12-CV-1509, 2013 WL 3833039, at *4
(C.D. Ill. July 23, 2013); Clean Harbors Env’t Servs., Inc. v. ESIS, Inc., No. 09 C 3789, 2011
WL 1897213, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011); Habtegiorgis v. OIC of Wash., No. CV-083077, 2010 WL 11618662, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2010), on reconsideration in part, 2010
WL 2232142 (E.D. Wash. June 2, 2010); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216
F.R.D. 280, 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Other courts simply pick a number, an amount of costs
to shift, without discussion. Zeller v. S. Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2584,
2014 WL 2094340, at *10–11 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014).
601 Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 464, at 2 (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs.
Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Md. 2009)).
602 Design Basics, LLC v. Carhart Lumber Co., 2014 WL 6669844, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 24,
2014).
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As John Adams famously noted, “facts are stubborn things.”603 The case law
makes clear that “facts” are commonly absent from cost-shifting motions.604 The goal
here is to require them and base decisions on them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of the 178 judicial decisions analyzed for this research, seventy decisions, thirtynine percent, ordered some form of cost shifting. Eighty-four decisions, forty-seven
percent, denied requests to shift costs, and the remainder either denied the discovery
outright or denied the request pending additional discovery or motion practice. Of the
fifty decisions handed down since the 2015 amendments, the court shifted all or a
portion of the costs in thirty percent of the cases.605 The actual numbers are higher, as
this excludes an increasing number of decisions where the discovery is denied
outright, or the motion is denied pending additional discovery or motion practice.
There are those who argue that this percentage should be higher still: The courts
should flip the presumption that the responding party pays to a presumption that the
requesting party pays all or part of the costs of responding to discovery, i.e., switch to
a user-pays model.606 Practitioners, and some of the courts, have argued that absent
cost sharing the requesting party does not have “skin in the game.”607 Courts and
commentators note that, “[a]side from the comparatively minimal costs of drafting
their discovery requests and considering the responses, litigants bear none of the costs
of producing the information that they demand.”608 As the argument goes, this creates
incentives to propound broad-brush discovery.609 There is “no economic incentive for
the party asking for information to moderate its requests to ensure that they are
proportional to the issues at stake and not excessively expensive to the producing
party.”610 According to some, “[t]he American rule is perhaps the greatest single
catalyst of discovery abuse,” because it allows plaintiffs to impose tremendous costs
on defendants at virtually no cost to themselves.611
603 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 68 (2001).
604 See supra notes 574–95.
605 Research for the Article excluded decisions addressing cost-shifting requests by nonparties responding to a subpoena and cost-shifting imposed as a sanction because the legal
standards are different. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37, 45(d)(1).
606 See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 773; Beisner, supra note 13, at 586.
607 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521.
608 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8 at 800; accord Mast, supra note 13, at 1830; Pulver,
supra note 13, at 1401–02.
609 See, e.g., Lubber, Inc. v. Optari LLC, No. 3:11-0042, 2012 WL 899631, at *2 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 15, 2012); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *6
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010).
610 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521.
611 Beisner, supra note 13, at 587 (noting contrary views found in Emery G. Lee III &
Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J.
765, 787 (2010)); accord Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
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The solution, it is said, is to require “skin in the game.”612 If requesting parties are
required to pay the expense of producing the discovery, they will internalize its costs
and ask for only what they are willing to pay to obtain.613 Some advocate adopting a
user pays rule for all discovery.614 Some propose such a rule for all discovery, but with
government subsidies for the financially weak in public interest litigation.615 Some
propose one-way fee-shifting if plaintiff’s case is dismissed on summary judgment,616
and some a presumption in favor of reimbursing the responding party for some or all
costs, depending on “the resources of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.”617 Some propose a “copay” for discovery where the requesting party is assessed ten percent of the costs of
the responding party.618 Some propose special rules just for eDiscovery: a user-pays
rule for all eDiscovery; or increased cost shifting for eDiscovery;619 or cost shifting
when seeking inaccessible ESI;620 or cost shifting if the discovery doesn’t turn up
anything.621
The problem is that the “invisible hand of incentives” moves whether the
responding or requesting party pays. Experiments with loser-pay regimes suggest that
routine cost shifting can dramatically increase overall spending: when Florida
experimented with a loser pays regime in medical malpractice cases, defendant’s cost
rose 100%.622 With cost shifting motions, the case law shows, time and again, that the

Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1393, 1398–99 (1994); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)—‘Much Ado About Nothing?, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 701 (1995); Peggy E.
Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, PUB. L. RSCH. INST.
(1995), http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html; Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment,
Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1),
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 91–92 (2001).
612 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521.
613 Id.; see also Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., 261 F.R.D. 127, 146 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
614 Beisner, supra note 13, at 587–88; Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 521–22.
615 See Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 815–16.
616 Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L. REV.
2117, 2119 (2018).
617 Redish & McNamara, supra note 8, at 822.
618 Robert D. Owens & Francis X. Nolan, Skin in the Game: A Proposed Co-Pay
Requirement for Discovery-Requesting Parties, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 6, 2017, at 3.
619 Redish, supra note 13; Mast, supra note 13, at 1837–38.
620 See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601–03
(E.D. Wis. 2004); Beisner, supra note 13, at 584–86; Pulver, supra note 13, at 1424.
621 OptoLum Inc. v. Cree Inc., No. 17CV687, 2018 WL 6834608, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 28,
2018).
622 Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs:
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 345, 355–78 (1990).
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responding party has “every incentive to respond extravagantly to discovery
requests.”623
These incentives to “respond extravagantly to discovery requests” to argue undue
burden align with the incentives of law firms and vendors to use the discovery process
as a profit center. As discussed supra, court filings show law firms marking up the
costs of attorney review over 500%, and the Sedona Conference finds the process for
protecting privileged ESI from production simply “broken.”624 Industry insiders
describe an eDiscovery industry where vendors “racked up immense bills without
delivering immense value.”625 Others in the industry have described eDiscovery as “an
insanely inefficient process” that involves “a lot of nickel-and-diming.”626
Those nickels and dimes add up. Litigants spent an estimated $10.11 billion on
eDiscovery in 2018.627 Analysts predict that will grow to $18.7 billion by 2023.628
Reversing the presumption for who pays for discovery simply shifts the burden of
funding industry growth from $10.1 billion to $18.7 billion. Focusing only on
proportionality and cost shifting codifies the waste inherent in an “insanely inefficient
process.” It ensures that costs remain high. It ensures that relevant discovery takes a
back seat to “discovery wars” aided by a multi-billion-dollar industry.629
As Judge Grimm notes, reversing the presumption that the producing party must
pay its own costs in responding to proper discovery requests would be “a radical
departure from the method by which civil cases have been litigated in federal court
since the adoption of the discovery rules in 1938.”630 Similarly, the Advisory
623 Norris, supra note 616, at 2119.
624 Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, supra note 540, at 103,
155 (Principle 4).
625 Ansel Halliburton, Modus Is Trying to Shake Up the Fat eDiscovery Industry,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/04/03/modus-is-trying-to-shake-upthe-fat-ediscovery-industry/.
626 Matt Weinberger, How One Startup Wants to Solve an 'Insane' Problem for a $400 Billion
Industry, BUS. INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/logikcull-is-trying-to-fix-ediscovery2015-5#ixzz3e0YnJAH9 (last visited June 24, 2015); Erin E. Harrison, E-Discovery a ‘Stain’
TECH.
NEWS
(July
21,
2015),
on
the
Legal
System,
LEGAL
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202732652593/EDiscovery-a-Stain-on-the-LegalSystem?kw=EDiscovery%20a%20%E2%80%98Stain%E2%80%99%20on%20the%20Legal%20System&et
=editorial&bu=Law%20Technology%20News&cn=20150721&src=EMCEmail&pt=Daily%20Alert&slreturn=20150621115743.
627 Rob Robinson, An eDiscovery Market Size Mashup: 2018-2023 Worldwide Software and
Services Overview, COMPLEX DISCOVERY (Aug. 29, 2017), https://complexdiscovery.com/anediscovery-market-size-mashup-worldwide-software-and-services-overview-2018-2023/.
628 Id.
629 Practitioners used the term “Discovery Wars” when writing about Rule 30(b)(6)
depositions. Madhavi K. Seth & Vikram S. Arora, Discovery Wars, 108 ILL. BAR J. 38, 38
(2020).
630 Grimm & Yellin, supra note 13, at 522.
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Committee Notes to the 2015 amendments to Rule 26 suggest the change “does not
imply that cost-shifting should become common practice” and the former chair of the
committee cautioned, “[c]ost shifting is now and should be in the future a rare
occurrence.”631 Yet, cost shifting has, in fact, become common practice.632
This Article proposes an alternative to this radical shift: make the cost-shifting
analysis more objective and the process cheaper. Require cooperation before cost
shifting. Cooperation will lead to “just, speedy, and efficient” discovery methods that
simply shifting costs will not, because asking “can it be done more efficiently” results
in a different answer than asking “is the discovery unduly burdensome”?
Change starts with courts interpreting the proportionality and cost-shifting factors
to require objective information to answer both questions. As set out above, the courts
should interpret each factor to call for verifiable information. One can objectively
determine the importance of the issues, by analyzing whether the case impacts more
than the named litigants. One can more objectively define the value of the case, by
requiring submission of evidence regarding the amount in controversy and the nonmonetary relief requested. One can objectively define the parties’ relative access to
information by examining access at the file level, as opposed to the type of
information. One can objectively define the parties’ resources by requiring evidence
of the same, rather than exploring resources theoretically available to the parties. One
can objectively analyze the importance of the discovery by requiring disclosure of
information necessary to define core discovery in that case. One can more objectively
define the burden and benefit of this discovery by mandating cooperation in the form
of disclosure of information sufficient to enable both parties to obtain cost estimates
and explore alternatives.
This last step allows the courts to ask, is there a better way, prior to considering
whether the discovery is unduly burdensome. In doing so, this Article suggests that
courts follow the best practices of practitioners when they outsource work: require
multiple proposals.633 Require the responding party obtain and submit more than one
proposal. Require the responding party share sufficient information to enable the
requesting party to obtain an estimate. If the parties are required to obtain multiple
estimates in advance of the discovery, vendors, knowing there is competition, have
incentives to propose efficient alternatives, and the courts have choices.
Mandating this type of cooperation means requiring disclosure of key information.
As a precondition to reviewing a cost-shifting or proportionality motion, courts should
require an exchange of information regarding the information technology systems at
issue, key custodians, key terms, key sources of ESI, and date ranges in order to
specifically tailor the discovery.634 There is nothing new about requiring the exchange
of this type of information: it is supposed to happen in the Rule 26(f) conference. But
the case law suggests that litigants routinely fail or refuse to provide this information
regarding contested discovery.

631 See Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 190, at 166 n.45.
632 See Judicial Roundtable, supra note 75, at 30.
633 See generally Sedona Conference, Guidance for the Selection of Electronic Discovery
Providers, 18 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 136 (2017).
634 See supra notes 574–95.
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This Article argues a responding party’s failure to cooperate by timely sharing this
information should serve as a basis for denying requests to preclude discovery or shift
its costs.635 Equally important, a requesting party’s failure to cooperate by failing to
engage in an iterative process to narrowly tailor discovery should serve as a basis for
shifting costs.636 As early as the 1980s, courts emphasized the importance of
cooperation in producing ESI.637 Decades later, courts still lament the “discovery
slugfest”638 and practitioners still write about “discovery wars.”639 Cooperation has
not happened by proclamation or exhortation. It will, if discovery depends on it.
Finally, if costs are shifted, courts should share control over the process or limit
reimbursement. As discussed above, from preservation to production, litigants have
options, and the standard for cost shifting, as with discovery, should be reasonableness
not perfection.640
Costs are determined by process, and courts have long held that a burden
voluntarily undertaken is not an undue burden.641 Yet, the courts continue to approve
use of high-priced vendors and processes, doubling the costs in some cases, and then
shifting them.642 If the responding party chooses to employ a more expensive process,
e.g., producing static images instead of native files, that party should pay for it. If the
responding party has adopted information governance practices that require expensive
discovery, e.g., short auto-delete periods and inaccessible backup media, that party
should pay the costs associated with producing information from those sources.
Creating incentives to utilize efficient processes should include incentives to limit
the seventy-three percent of the discovery costs spent on attorney review.643 One way
is to exclude them from the cost-shifting analysis.644 The majority of cases on cost
shifting do so, citing the American Rule and the responding party’s exclusive ability
to control the cost of review.645 This Article suggests that, if courts do shift the costs
of review based on proportionality considerations, they should allocate only those
costs associated with the least expensive means of review aided by technology and a
635 See supra notes 585–97.
636 See supra notes 601–04.
637 Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).
638 UnitedHealthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs. LLC, No. 16-CV-81180, 2017 WL
4785457, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017).
639 Seth & Arora, supra note 629, at 38.
640 See Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, Deconstructing "Discovery About Discovery", 19 SEDONA
CONF. J. 215, 220 (2018) (“discovery is governed by a standard of reasonableness, not
perfection.”).
641 See supra notes 101–02, 369–73.
642 See supra notes 317–32.
643 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 28, at xiii- xv.
644 See supra notes 533–35.
645 See supra notes 533–39.
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Rule 502(d) order.646 If the responding party chooses linear review for all or a portion
of the production set, the traditional cost-allocation rules should apply.647 If the
responding party chooses to review ESI unlikely to contain privileged material, e.g. a
customer calls database, the traditional cost-allocation rules should apply.648 Doing so
not only minimizes costs in litigation, it encourages sound information governance
practices. Parties that properly label and organize information in advance will have
higher recall rates. In short, the cost-shifting analysis can encourage efficiency.
As set out above, in 2010, the Duke Conference concluded that cooperation,
proportionality, and sustained, hands-on judicial case management were needed.649
The 2015 revisions to the federal rules codified two legs of that three-legged stool,
with amendments to the rules addressing proportionality and case management.650 A
two-legged stool, however, is a precarious perch—one almost impossible to balance.
Mandating cooperation to produce better information, better processes, and better
incentives provides the third leg. Doing so does not require a rule change; it does
require consistent application of the best practices now found in some of the case law.
Focusing solely on cost shifting or proportionality will not result in a “just, speedy,
and efficient” determination of an action. Requiring cooperation will.

646 See supra notes 555–65.
647 See supra Part IV.F.4.
648 Id.; Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341–43 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
649 2014 Judicial Conference Summary Report, supra note 21, at Rules App. B-2–B-3.
650 Id. at B-11–B-12.
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